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INTRODUCTION

Twenty years after the publication of Catharine MacKinnon's pathbreak:ing
book, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination, 1
the concept of "sexual harassment" remains deeply controversial. The number
of workplace sexual harassment claims filed annually with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has risen by more than fifty percent since the
beginning of the 1990s.2 But while many Americans have come to accept the
principle that men should not make crude or threatening sexual advances to female
subordinates at work, even this basic principle is fraught with uncertainty.
Since the publication of MacKinnon's book in 1979, hundreds of law journal
articles have addressed the issue of workplace sexual harassment. Recent
scholarly discussion of harassment, however, has focused almost exclusively on
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,3 which prohibits workplace discrimination based on sex. 4 This near-exclusive focus on Title VII as a means of
understanding and redressing workplace harassment is deeply misguided, as
scholars have turned doctrinal somersaults in order to claim that virtually every form
of sexual harassment, including same-sex sexual harassment, is discrimination on the
basis of sex. Such attempts to shoehorn all forms of sexual harassment into Title VII
have failed to diminish noticeably the public confusion about sexual harassment
and have led to a distorted definition of sex discrimination.
The excessive reliance on Title VII has also led scholars to overlook the fact
that workplace harassment, sexual or nonsexual, is fundamentally a dignitary
harm: an affront to the victim's dignity and personality interests. As a result,
despite the explosion of scholarship on sexual harassment, a coherent and
robust account of what is wrong with all forms of workplace harassment, both
sexual and nonsexual, is lacking.
Scholarly discussion of sexual harassment tends to confiate two very different
things: the nature of the harm of harassment, which is a dignitary harm, and the
context in which the harm of harassment occurs, which is a context of discrimination. The excessive focus on the discriminatory context in which the workplace harassment of women occurs, which results from the heavy emphasis on
Title VII, has tended to foster an essentialist conception of sexual harassment as
a special "women's injury"; this conception, in turn, has fueled an antifeminist

I. CATHARINE A. MACKiNNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (I979).
2. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Sexual Harassment Charges (visited
Feb. 25, 1999) <www.eeoc.gov/stats/harass.html>; see also Katherine M. Franke, Gender, Sex,
Agency, and Discrimination, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1245 (1998) (claiming that "sexual harassment is the
fastest growing area of employment discrimination").
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994). Title VII also prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, or national origin.
4. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REv.
1169 (1998); Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691
(1997); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. I683 (I998).
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backlash against the very notion of sexual harassment. 5 lt is important to realize
that workplace harassment, sexualized or nonsexualized, injures the dignitary
interests of individual harassment victims, regardless of their sex and regardless
of the sex of their harassers. The workplace harassment of women is wrong not
because women are women, but because women are human beings.
Now is the time for a fundamental change in how harassment in the workplace is considered. This article argues for a comprehensive re-examination of
how workplace harassment is conceptualized. Title Vll should maintain an
important place, because discrimination against women remains a grave societal
problem. However, a focus on Title VII-with its emphasis on sex discrimination-must be balanced by an equal focus on the dignitary harm aspects of
harassment. Only a dignitary harm focus permits the development of a robust legal
theory that allows simultaneous recognition of the ongoing problem of workplace
discrimination against women and, at the same time, permits the development of
broad, tort-based remedies for the many kinds of nondiscriminatory and nonsexual dignitary harms that injure both men and women in the workplace.
Part I of this article briefly examines some of the drawbacks and inconsistencies of Title VII sexual harassment jurisprudence and shows that Title VII does
not provide an adequate framework for understanding many common forms of
workplace harassment. Title VII is unquestionably a critical means of fighting
against workplace discrimination; however, by emphasizing discrimination at
the expense of dignity, the Title VII workplace harassment paradigm provides
an incomplete understanding of the wrongs of workplace harassment.
Part II of this article asserts the importance of an approach to sexual
harassment that distinguishes between the nature of the harm of workplace
sexual harassment (a dignitary harm) and the context in which the harm occurs
(a context of discrimination against women). A pluralistic understanding of
workplace harassment permits the provision of legal remedies for workers of
any sex or sexual orientation who suffer from abusive treatment (whether sexual
or nonsexual in nature), while still recognizing that workplace harassment
occurs in patterned ways and has historically operated to exclude women, in
particular, from equal access to social, political, and economic power. While
Title VII highliglits the discriminatory-and often sexist-motives and patterns
in many cases of workplace harassment, harassment is not a matter of concern
only when "sexual." Further, fue claim fuat workplace harassment is a "group

5. For a recent example of this backlash, see Dr. Vernon Colemen, Dr. Vernon s Casebook: Hairdo
Compliment Got Me Real Wigging, THE PEOPLE, Feb. 7, 1999, at 41: "Most sexual harassment cases are
nonsense. Such politically correct madness is making life dull and miserable for most sane and healthy
human beings. It is one of the great tragedies of the 20th century that most men are now afraid to
compliment-let alone flirt with-women in case they find themselves accused and convicted of the
often absurd and frequently over-valued modern crime of sexual harassment." Cf Robert L. Steinback,
'Reverse PC' Becomes Self-Centeredness Chic, THE AusTIN AM.-STATESMAN, June 22, 1997, at H3
("Speak about sensitivity to any American demographic group, and you'd better brace yourself for a
torrent of peeve and ridicule.").
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harm" that only affects women is too simplistic. First, as Vicki Schultz has
eloquently argued, not all discriminatory workplace harassment of women is
"sexual" in nature. 6 Second, men as well as women can be subjected to
harassment and abusive treatment at work. A pluralistic understanding of workplace harassment must reflect these insights.
Part III of this article contends that common-law tort causes of action provide
a promising way to address the dignitary harm element of "classic" cases of
sexual harassment, those involving male harassers and female victims. Twenty
years ago, feminist scholars such as MacKinnon considered-and rejected-this
approach. 7 Dismissing a tort approach in this manner, while understandable in
1979, now does a disservice to women and other harassment victims. Moving
beyond "classic" cases of sexual harassment, Part III of this article also argues
that common-law tort causes of action contain the germ of a more general right
to be free of severe dignitary harm in the workplace and that the changing social
meaning of work should be deemed to create special duties for employers in
protecting all workers from workplace harassment, sexual and nonsexual.
Part IV defends this approach against several possible objections. These
objections include the "group harm" objection, "the rigid courts" objection, the
"liability and preemption" objection, and the "civility code" objection.
Finally, Part V demonstrates why a pluralistic understanding of workplace
harassment would benefit all workers while strengthening feminist efforts to
protect women from workplace discrimination. A pluralistic approach to workplace harassment-one that combines the use of Title VII, where appropriate,
with tort causes of action-has three important benefits. First, such a pluralistic
approach allows for legal remedies for the many workers who experience severe
6. Schultz distinguishes nonsexual, gender-based discriminatory workplace harassment from that
resulting from sexual motives:
[Mluch of the gender-based hostility and abuse that women (and some men) endure at work
is neither driven by the desire for sexual relations nor even sexual in content. Indeed, many of
the most prevalent forms of harassment are actions that are designed to maintain workparticularly the more highly rewarded lines of work-as bastions of masculine competence
and authority. Every day, in workplaces all over the country, men uphold the image that their
jobs demand masculine mastery by acting to undermine their female colleagues' perceived (or
sometimes even actual) competence to do the work. The forms of such harassment are
wide-ranging. They include characterizing the work as appropriate for men only; denigrating
women's performance or ability to master the job; providing patronizing forms of help in
performing the job; withholding the training, information, or opportunity to learn to do the
job well; engaging in deliberate work sabotage; providing sexist evaluations of women's
performance or denying them deserved promotions; isolating women from the social networks that confer a sense of belonging; denying women the perks or privileges that are
required for success; assigning women sex-stereo-typed service tasks that lie outside their job
descriptions (such as cleaning or serving coffee); engaging in taunting, pranks, and other
forms of hazing designed to remind women that they are different and out of place; and
physically assaulting or threatening to assault the women who dare to fight back.
Schultz, supra note 4, at 1686-87.
7. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note I, at 88; see also Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias:
Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 463,516 (1998).
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harassment on the job, but who would be hard-pressed to assert that their
harassment was "because of sex," as required by even the most expansive
reading of Title VII. Second, a pluralistic approach keeps the primary focus of
Title VII where it should be: on addressing the problem of widespread workplace discrimination against members of less powerful groups, such as racial,
ethnic, and religious minorities, and, of course, women. Third, grounding
understanding of the sexual harassment of women in a notion of dignitary harm
as well as in a discrimination paradigm makes a critical political and philosophical point: The workplace harassment of women is wrong not because women
are women, but because women are human beings and share with all other
human beings the right to be treated in the workplace with respect and concern.
I.

CONFUSION AND CONTROVERSY
A. POPULAR CONFUSION

The hundreds of articles on sexual harassment published in American newspapers and magazines each year testify to the ongoing cultural confusion about
sexual harassment: 8 Just what is it?9 If wrong, why is it wrong? What can you
say at work without getting into trouble? Can you tell a dirty joke? Put up a
picture of your girlfriend (or boyfriend) naked or in a skimpy bathing suit? Ask
your secretary out on a date? Ask your coworker out on a date? Ask your boss
out on a date? Comment on your secretary's clothes? Should a construction-site
sign that reads "Men Working" be deemed to violate federal antidiscrimination
law? 10 Has, as one commentator charges, "bad taste ... become a federal offense"? 11
Did Clarence Thomas sexually harass Anita Hill? Did Bill Clinton harass Paula
Jones? Did he harass Monica Lewinsky? Can a woman sexually harass a man?
Can a woman sexually harass a woman, 12 or a man sexually harass a man? 13
Sexual harassment often partakes, at least to some degree, of "1-know-it-when1-see-it-ness." 14 The average person can likely distinguish between a tentative,

8. See, e.g., Editorial, Tougher, Clearer Rules on Sexual Harassment, SEATILE TIMEs, July 7, 1998,
at B4 ("ASK the man or woman on the street to explain sexual harassment, and they'll ramble on in the
vagaries that have defined this area of workplace misconduct for years."); see also Kenneth Lasson,
Professors Feel PC Chill, DENVER PosT, Feb. 18, 1996, at E-01; Herbert London, Defining Harassment
Beyond Rationality, WASH. TIMEs, Oct. 2, 1996, at A 19.
9. See, e.g., Editorial, What is Sexual Harassment?, ST. LoUIS POST DISPATCH, June 28, 1998, at B2 ("For
months the country has been ... wondering out loud about what constitutes sexual harassment.").
10. See. Vince J. Scbodolski, Harassment Suits Curb Workplace Freedom of Speech: Groups Admit
Rights Are Being Trampled, CHICAGO Thrn., June 23, 1997, at I.
11. Linda Chavez, Sexual Harassment Game is Getting Out of Hand, MILWAUKEE I.-SENTINEL,
Aug. 3, 1996, at 10.
12. See generally Aimee L. Widor, Fact or Fiction?: Role-Reversal Sexual Harassment in the
Modem Workplace, 58 U. PITT. L. REv. 225 (1996).
13. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998) (male employee alleged male
coworkers picked on him, called him names suggesting homosexuality, and instilled fear of being raped).
14. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (claiming, about
obscenity, "I know it when I see it").
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but unwanted, sexual overture or a clumsy compliment on the one hand and a
hostile and demeaning series of sexual threats and mockeries on the other.
Nonetheless, to the extent that talk of sexual harassment tends inevitably to
generate some hostile comments and questions, some of the ridicule and
hostility may arise out of a deeply felt sense that sexual harassment doctrine is
filled with vagueness and c.ontradictions. 15
B. SCHOLARLY UNHAPPINESS WITH TITLE VII JURISPRUDENCE: WHY IS SEXUAL
HARASSMENT SEX DISCRIMINATION?

When lawyers, judges, and scholars speak of sexual harassment, Title VII of
the federal Civil Rights Act, whicb prohibits discrimination in hiring, firing, and
compensation, or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, 16 is generally presumed to
be the applicable legal provision. Several major feminist articles about sexual
harassment, most of which are explicitly motivated by a desire to restore some
of Title VII's doctrinal integrity, have evolved during the past year or two. Take,
for instance, the recent work of Kathryn Abrams, Katherine Franke, and Vicki
Schultz. 17 Although these writers differ substantially in their understanding of
the proper role of Title VII in regulating workplace behavior, they all accept a
basic premise: that Title VII sexual harassment jurisprudence is rife with
contradictions and apparent paradoxes and must be significantly reconceptualized. Thus, Franke asks:
What exactly is wrong with sexual harassment? Why is it sex discrimination?
... While our intuitions may lead us to conclude that when a man directs
offensive sexual conduct at a female colleague, sexual discrimination is afoot,
the Supreme Court has not offered a theory as to why this is the case ....
[Major feminist theories] of the wrong of sexual harassment don't do the
work they purport to. When pressed, they provide indeterminate and unprincipled outcomes .... 18

Abrams echoes this lament, observing that after "almost two decades of litigation," sexual harassment doctrine is filled with "inconsistencies, exclusions and
misunderstandings." 19 Schultz further critiques Title VII jurisprudence, arguing
that the dominant "desire-based" paradigm for understanding sex discrimina-

I5. The Supreme Court has done little to clarify this murky area of the law. In 1998, the Supreme
Court decided several cases about sexual harassment under Title VII, but each decision was quite
narrow: Burlington Industries v. Ellenh, 524 U.S. 742 (I998), and Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775 (1998), dealt primarily with the issue of determining employer liability for hostile environment
sexual harassment by supervisory employees, while Oncale determined only that same-sex sexual
harassment suits are not per se barred by Title VII.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
I7. See Abrams, supra note 4; Franke, supra note 4; Schultz, supra note 4.
I8. Franke, supra note 4, at 691-93.
19. Abrams, supra note 4, at 1171.
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tion under Title VII "has compromised the law's protection. Principal among its
drawbacks, the paradigm is underinclusive, omitting-and even obscuring-'
many of the most prevalent forms of harassment that make workplaces hostile
and alienating to workers based on their gender." 20
Abrams, Franke, and Schultz are all inheritors of the same feminist legal
tradition, and a concern about the same apparent problems in Title VII jurisprudence permeates their recent work. 21 First and foremost, they each note that the
reasons why sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination are not intuitively obvious: Is it because a man who propositions a female employee would
presumably not have propositioned a male employee, and thus, the propositioned woman has been treated differently than her male colleagues because of
her sex? Is it because sexual harassment is motivated by hostility to the
presence of women in the workplace? Is it because, in a context of patriarchy
and sexual violence against women, the mere presence of sexuality in the
workplace, however motivated, is inherently threatening to women, and prevents them from enjoying their work and succeeding on the same basis as
men? 22 As many commentators have noted, none of these three common
explanations is trouble-free, 23 therefore making instructive a brief discussion of
the most commonly cited problems.
1. The Formal Equality Argument
The first explanation-the notion that sexual harassment of women by men is
sex discrimination because it violates formal equality principles-faces the
20. Schultz, supra note 4, at 1689.
21. It should be noted that in addition to its doctrinal problems, Title VII presents a number of
practical barriers to recovery for those who believe they have been harassed in a discriminatory fashion.
For instance, Title VII applies only to workplaces with more than 15 full-time employees, leaving
employees in smaller workplaces with no federal statutory remedy. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e. Title VII
also requires plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies before litigating; they must go through a
cumbersome process of submitting their claims to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for
approval before being given permission to sue on their own, and they may be deprived of the ability to
go to court and forced into mandatory arbitration. See id. Finally, Title VII places a cap (currently
$300,000) on the amount of punitive damages employees can recover from their employers. See 42
U.S.C. § 1981a.
22. For this typology of the prevailing explanations, see generally Franke, supra note 4.
23. See, e.g., id.; Mark Mclaughlin Hager, Harassment as a Ton: Why Title VII Hostile Environment Liability Should be Cunailed, 30 CoNN. L. REv. 375, 376 (1998) (arguing that "discrimination
law as an anti-harassment weapon is morally and legally confused, dubious in effectiveness, and deeply
troubling in its unintended consequences"); Schultz, supra note 4. Bernstein has noted:
[S]exual harassment [is] now a legal wrong and a cultural colossus. But as doctrine the phrase
remains elusive, connoting no specific type of harm .... The gap between competing perspectives on sexual harassment, so indicative of confusion and disagreement, has never been
satisfactorily bridged. Meanwhile, the topic expands in notoriety. While judges and scholars
try to define and explain [it], its meaning-a nimble Houdini of legal doctrine--continues to
escape their chains.
Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, Ill HARV. L. REV. 445, 446-48 (1997); see
also Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE L. &
PoL'Y REv. 333 (1990).
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problem of "the equal opportunity harasser": the person who harasses both men
and women. If a male employer is bisexual, for instance, and propositions both
his female employees and his male employees, one may logically say that no
one has been treated differently on the basis of sex, and therefore, no discrimination has occurred within the meaning of Title VII. 24 This conclusion is troubling, however, for regardless of what Title VII has to say about this issue, a
crude and threatening sexual proposition should not cease to be legally actionable because both men and women have to put up with it.
Considering same-sex sexual harassment, a similar problem emerges with the
formal equality justification for treating sexual harassment as sex discrimination: if the male harasser is gay, for instance, and harasses another man, it
makes sense, in a wholly formal way, to say that the victim would not have been
harassed had he not been male (though to many feminists, permitting such male
victims of homosexual harassment to recover under Title VII obscures the basic
point that women, not men, have historically suffered from sex discrimination).25 This premise is complicated if a straight man harasses another manperhaps a gay or "effeminate" coworker-by taunting him, threatening to rape
him, or insulting him using sexualized language. 26 The courts have made clear
that Title VII does not protect against discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. 27 If a man singles out another man for abuse, sexualized or not, the

24. It should be noted that in practice, very few alleged harassers have sought to raise this defense.
See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, The. Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming
2000) ("Such defendants appear to be the subjects of fiction or hypotheticals rather than actual
litigation-the defense has been raised in only two cases and has been rejected in both.") (citations
omitted).
25. Cf Schultz, supra note 4, at nn.43 & 50.
26. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., I 18 S. Ct. 998, 1001 (1998) (male employee
alleged male coworkers picked on him, called him names suggesting homosexuality, and instilled fear
of being raped); McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, ll93 (4th Cir. 1996)
(male employee alleged male coworkers teased him about his sexual activities, exposed themselves to
him, placed condom in his food, and physically assaulted and fondled him); Dillon v. Frank, No.
90-2290, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 766, at *l (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992) (male employee alleged fellow
employees called him a 'fag,' told others he 'gives head,' and physically assaulted him); Martin v.
Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 926 F. Supp. 1044, 1046 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (male employee alleged male coworkers
groped him and tried to kiss him, told him he was 'pretty' and 'cute,' insulted his girlfriend, and offered
to expose their genitals to him); Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1454 (N.D. III. 1988) (male
employee alleged male coworkers harassed him for not being married,· teased him about women,
accused him of being gay, and poked him in buttocks with stick).
27. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Ulane v.
Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d l08l (7th Cir. 1994). For a fuller discussion of these and other cases with
similar holdings, see WILLIAM RUBENSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE
LAW 461 (1997).
In this article, I am rather critical of the attempts that have been made to understand same-sex
harassment as "sex discrimination" within the meaning of Title VII. I argue that these attempts do
violence to the concept of discrimination based on sex, contribute to a growing backlash against people
who claim to be victims of sexual harassment, and weaken women's protection against workplace
discrimination. Although a fuller discussion of the issue of harassment based on sexual orientation is
beyond the scope of this article, I should make it clear that my objection to shoehorning same-sex
harassment into Title VII is based on a belief that we should keep our concept of "discrimination based
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victim in most cases appears to have little likelihood of prevailing under Title
VII.zs

2. The Subordination Argument
The second commonly offered explanation-that sexual harassment is discriminatory because it is motivated by hostility toward women in the workplaceassumes too much, for some sexual harassment may in fact be motivated by
sexual desire, by a personal dislike of the victim, or by some other motive,
which, however regrettable, is not the same as a general hostility to the presence
of women in the workplace. Further, the notion that sexual harassment is wrong
because motivated by a desire to prevent women from working in traditionally
male settings also poses problems in addressing situations of same-sex harassment. If a male employer fires his male subordinate for refusing to respond to
his sexual advances, it makes little sense to say that his action discriminates
against women-at least if one uses the term "discriminate" in the colloquial
sense of the word-or, indeed, against men.Z 9 Concluding that the firing dis-

on sex" as straightforward and intelligible as possible, rather than on a belief that workplace discrimination against gays, lesbians, or bisexuals is not a serious problem.
I would be entirely in favor of amending Title VII to prohibit workplace discrimination based on
actual or perceived sexual orientation. Claiming that discrimination based on sexual orientation is a
form of sex discrimination, however, does a disservice both to women and to gays and lesbians: far
better, I think, to keep our concept of sex discrimination clear, and at the same time, push for laws
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Also, as I argue later in this article, a tort
regime for addressing workplace harassment would allow victims of same-sex harassment to recover
without jeopardizing the concept of discrimination based on sex.
28. The Supreme Court addressed the issue of same-sex harassment in Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at
1002--03. Oncale holds that same-sex harassment is actionable under Title VII if it is "sex discrimination," but implicitly holds out only two possibilities for showing that sex discrimination exists: (l) the
plaintiff could show that he (or she) was harassed because of homosexual desire on the part of the
same-sex defendant, or (2) the plaintiff could show that the harasser was motivated by a "general
hostility" to members of the plaintiffs sex in the workplace. In practice, plaintiffs are likely to find
proving either of these things difficult.
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff who
was discriminated against because she failed to meet her employer's stereotyped view of how a woman
should look and behave was held to have stated a claim under Title VII. An expansive reading of Price
Waterhouse suggests that male-on-male harassment should be actionable if the harassee is victimized
because he fails to behave in stereotypically "masculine" ways; in theory, this approach might enable a
gay man harassed because of his sexual orientation to file a valid Title VII claim, arguing that his
harassment was motivated not by his sexual orientation per se but by his failure to comply with
"appropriate" gender stereotypes. But the Court's narrow holding in Oncale and its failure to make any
reference to the reasoning in Price Waterhouse suggests that in practice this argument won't succeed in
the current political and judicial climate.
29. Relying in part on Price Waterhouse, discussed supra note 28, Franke, Abrams, and Schultz all
accept some variant of the argument that male harassment of "effeminate" men can be seen as part of
what Franke labels a "technology of sexism": in other words, effeminate men are harassed by male
colleagues out of the same reliance on restrictive gender stereotypes that causes men to harass women.
Construed broadly, such incidents of same sex harassment could plausibly be seen as discriminating
against women. These arguments strike me as having a great deal of force, but it should be noted that
they require going well beyond the popularly understood concept of discrimination. See Franke, supra
note 4, at 767-68; Abrams, supra note 4, at 1226; Schultz, supra note 4, at 1789.
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criminates against men is similarly ludicrous because the action appears un- ·
likely to be motivated by a generalized hostility to men in the workplace. 30
3. The "All Sex Subordinates Women" Argument
The third common justification for treating sexual harassment as sex discrimination-that in a violent and patriarchal society, any sexual words or behavior
in the workplace act to intimidate women-is greatly overinclusive, demeaning
to women as agents, and likely to lead to the chilling of innocuous and healthy
forms of sexual expression. 31 As Schultz notes, "Just as gender-based oppression occurs outside the realm of the sexual, so too does the sphere of sexuality
encompass more than simply oppression. Sexual relations-heterosexual or
otherwise--do not inherently enact male dominance over women." 32 To the
extent that all sexual words and behavior are viewed as oppressive in the
workplace, employers may fear that permitting such sexual expression will
render them vulnerable to sexual harassment suits. This "invites companies to
discipline or discharge workers for the wrong reasons," observes Schultz? 3 She
asserts, "ln my view, it is misguided to attempt to banish all hints of sexuality
from the workplace. For one thing, it will not work .... [S]exuality permeates
organizations and, so long as organizations are made up of human beings, will
continue to flourish in one form or another. " 34
C. FEMINIST EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE CONTRADICTIONS

Responding to these tensions in common accounts of Title VII doctrine,
recent feminist scholarship has sought to clarify the ways in which sexual
harassment might be viewed as constituting sex discrimination. Franke, Abrams,
and Schultz, for instance, each provide accounts of Title VII that place sexism
and gender stereotyping at the center of the problem of sexual harassment. 35
To Franke, sexual harassment is part of a "technology of sexism": it reaffirms oppressive and discriminating gender stereotypes that harm both women
and men and, in so doing, constitutes a form of sex discrimination. 36 1n Franke's
view, Title VII should permit same-sex harassment actions brought by men or
women who were harassed for failure to conform to sexist gender stereotypes
and should also permit more traditional actions from women who have been
harassed hy men. 37 Abrams shares Franke's basic conception that sexual harassment is about subordination, hut insists that the central focus of Title VII should
30. This possibility is raised by the Court in Oncale, liS S. Ct. at 1002, but it is quite unlikely, in
practice, that plaintiffs could prove this.
31. See Schultz, supra note 4, at 1689.
32. /d. at 1790.
33. ld. at 1793.
34. /d. at 1794.
35. Schultz also argues that work, and its social meaning, is central to the problem of sexual
harassment. See id. at 1790-99.
36. See Frallke, supra note 4, at 693,762-71.
37. See id. at 693-94.
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remain on remedying the workplace oppression of women because women, not
men, are disproportionately harmed by sexual harassment. 38 Schultz agrees with
Franke, arguing that the purpose of Title VII is to dismantle workplace segregation by integrating women into jobs traditionally dominated by men. 39
Recent feminist scholarship on Title Vll has also been animated significantly
by a desire to '~fit everything in" beneath the Title VII umbrella, making room
for as many kinds of objectionable workplace sexual behavior as possible. In
particular, scholars have been anxious to find ways to view the sexual harassment of men and same-sex sexual harassment as sex discrimination under Title
VII. This temptation is natural; after all, if a male employer should be barred
from linking a female employee's job benefits to her compliance with his sexual
demands, then a female employer similarly should be barred from making quid
pro quo sexual demands of a male employee, and any employer should be
barred from making sexual demands of someone of the same sex. Similarly, if a
man may not create a hostile sexual environment for female employees-by
subjecting them to crude sexual jokes, commenting ceaselessly upon their
bodies, or using demeaning sexual epithets to speak to them-a woman, too,
should be prohibited from doing the same to a man in her workplace, as should
someone who acts this way toward a member of the same sex.
Several feminist scholars, however, have viewed these dilemmas as serious
challenges to Title VII doctrine. Franke, speaking of quid pro quo same sex
harassment cases and cases in which gay men create a hostile environment for
straight men, notes, "These cases raise that uncomfortable, yet inevitable,
intellectual moment when grand theory fails to provide a unifying and totalizing
approach to a problem ... [and these cases] present the most difficult challenge

38. See Abrams, supra note 4, at 1172.
39. Schultz, supra note 4, at 1758 (':The major purpose of Title VII was to dismantle sex
segregation by integrating women into work formerly reserved for men."). Schultz goes even further
than Abrams, noting that the predominant "desire-based paradigm" for understanding sexual harassment often leads the courts to trivialize certain kinds of sex-based, but nonsexual, forms of harassment
of women. Courts, she charges, have become overly accustomed to understanding sexual harassment
primarily in terms of actions that result from male sexual desire for women. See id. at 1689-92. As a
result, if an employer constantly criticizes female employees, or refuses to provide them with adequate
training or opportunities for advancement, but does not explicitly raise the issue of sexuality, courts are
often slow to interpret the harassment as discriminatory, even though it may be motivated solely by
hostility to women in the workplace. Similarly, if both sexualized harassment and nonsexual forms of
harassment are present in the same claim, courts are apt to disaggregate the two kinds of harassment,
treating the former under sexual harassment doctrine and subjecting the latter to disparate treatment
analysis, instead of considering the two kinds of harassment as two different, but related, tools by which
men try to keep women out of the workplace.
In practice, Schultz observes, treating the two kinds of harassment separately tends to trivialize both:
taken together, the two kinds of harassment may be severe and pervasive enough to alter working
conditions unreasonably, but taken apart, neither may strike myopic judicial eyes as rising to that level.
To Schultz, actions that tend to maintain workplaces as stereotypically "masculine" domains all
constitute sex discrimination. As a result, a man who is harassed by male coworkers because he fails to
conform to masculine gender stereotypes is as much a victim of sex-based discrimination as a woman
whose biological sex makes her unable to conform.
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to ... any theory of sex discrimination. " 40 On the one hand, excluding male-onmale harassment from the ambit of Title VII creates an apparent asymmetry and
the impression of arbitrariness. On the other hand, treating this kind of harassment as functionally equivalent to male harassment of women seems, in some
deep way, to do violence to the historical reality in which Title VII is rooted: 41
the reality is that most workplace sexual harassment is perpetrated by men
against women not by coincidence, but as part of a centuries-old pattern of the
subjection and exclusion of women from positions of economic and political power. 42
Franke would allow Title VII claims from men (and, presumably, women)
who face quid pro quo harassment from homosexual members of their own sex,
though she suggests that these cases be brought under the disparate treatment

40. Franke, supra note 4, at 767.
41. As this statement suggests, I favor an antisubordination approach to equal protection rather than
a formal equality approach. A full defense of this position is beyond the scope of this argument; for a
good recent summary of the debate as it intersects with sex discrimination issues, see Amy Nemko, Single Sex
Public Education after VMI: The Case for Womens Sclwols, 21 HARv. WOMEN's L.J. 19 (1998).
Despite Title VII's formal equality language, several courts have refused to find instances of
male-on-male harassment actionable under Title VII, finding that the male plaintiff was not a member of the
kind of "discrete and vulnerable group" Title VII was intended to protect. See, e.g., Ashworth v. Roundup, Co.,
897 F. Supp. 489, 493-94 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (approvingly quoting Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452,
1546 (N.D. III. 1988) ("The discrimination Congress was concerned about when it enacted Title VII is one
stemming from an imbalance of power and an abuse of that imbalance by the powerful which results in
discrimination against a discrete and vulnerable group.")); see also Benekritis v. Johnson, 882 F. Supp. 521,
525-26 (D.S.C. 1995); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822, 834-35 (D. Md. 1994)
(dismissing case because male plaintiff failed to state an actionable claim under Title VII, as intended by
Congress); Fleenor v. Hewitt Soap Co., No. C-3-94-182, 1995 WL 386793, at *2 (S.D. Ohio 1994). But see
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996) (reversing lower court decision barring same
sex harassment claims). The Court's 1998 decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., I 18 S. Ct.
998 (1998), discussed supra note 26, however, seems to bring an end to this line of cases.
42. While the language of Title VII is the language of formal equality, it is nonetheless true that
Title VII was enacted (and subsequently amended) out of a desire to protect women from discriminatory
workplace behavior. For example, see Schultz, supra note 4, at 1758 n.403:
Those who spoke in favor of the amendment adding the prohibition against sex discrimination to the original 1964 Civil Rights Act focused primarily on the injustice of sex segregation
of work. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 2579-80,2580-81 (1964) (statement of Rep. Griffith); id.
at 2580-81 (statement of Rep. St. George). Moreover, when Congress amended Title VII in
1972, see Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994)), both the House and the Senate made
clear that they considered such sex segregation to be the primary evil for the statute to
address. See H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 4-5 (1971) ("Women are placed in the less challenging, the less responsible and the less remunerative positions on the basis of their sex alone.
Such blatantly disparate treatment is particularly objectionable in view of the fact that Title
VII has specifically prohihited sex discrimination since its enactment in 1964."), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2140; S. REP. No. 92-415, at 7 (1971) (including similar statements).
At note 50, Schultz acknowledges that "a number of sources have characterized [the Title VII]
prohibition against sex discrimination as a joke-a last-ditch effort by opponents to defeat the
legislation," but cites, for a contrary view, Michael Evan Gold, A Tale of Two Amendments: The
Reasons Congress Added Sex to Title VII and Their Implication for the Issue of Comparable Worth, 19
DuQ. L. REv. 453, 457-69 (1981) (arguing that, even if the members of Congress who introduced the
amendment adding sex did so in an effort to defeat the bill, the majority of Congress did not have that
motivation when it approved the amendment).
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prong of Title VII. She also favors allowing claims from men who have been
subjected to sexualized "rough-housing," but only if they protest about the
workplace and then face retaliatory harassment. 43 Abrams, too, would permit
Title VII claims from men targeted by other men for workplace harassment for
failure to conform to appropriately masculine sexual stereotypes and would
likewise permit claims from men who have not been specifically singled out for
harassment, but who can nonetheless make plausible claims that "sexualized
talk or practices," as a form of "roughhousing or horsing around," have unreasonably
interfered with their work performance.44 Like Franke and Abrams, Schultz would
allow same-sex harassment claims where the harassment is linked to gender
stereotyping and the maintenance of a gender-stratified workplace. 45
Franke acknowledges her doubts about trying to fold too much into Title VII:
"Title Vll cannot and should not be the vehicle by which we dismantle every
hypermasculine or hyperfeminine microculture." 46 Franke suggests that "[w]orkplace sexual misconduct that does not play a role in the regulation and enforcement of hetero-patriarchal gender norms, while not actionable under sex
discrimination laws, should still be actionable under appropriate state tort,
contract, or even racketeering laws." 47 However, while she notes that "it may
make sense for states to enact statutes providing remedies for workplace sexual
misconduct," she leaves the problem "for another day." 48 Abrams, too, shares the
concern about trying to fit too much into Title VII. Ultimately, Abrams notes ruefully:
[O]ne size cannot fit all, theoretically speaking: it is crucial to see women's
inequality as the product of many intersecting motives, constructions, and
modes of treatment. Because sexual harassment has captured public attention
to perhaps a greater degree than any other gender-based injury, an understanding of sexual harassment that is explicitly, paradigmatically plural will be a
tremendous resource in this effort. 49

II.

TOWARD A PLURALISTIC UNDERSTANDING OF WORKPLACE HARASSMENT
A. TAKING UP THE CHALLENGE

Title Vll, then, has proved to be a Procrustean bed: 5° the only way to jam all
43. Franke, supra note 4, at 767-68; cf. Oncale, II8 S. Ct. at I003 (stating that Title VII requirements
"ensure that courts and juries do not mistake ordinary socializing in the workplace-such as male-on-male
horseplay or intersexual flirtation--for discriminatory 'conditions of employment' "(emphasis added)).
44. Abrams, supra note 4, at 1226.
45. See Schultz, supra note 4, at 1789.
46. Franke, supra note 4, at 769.
47. /d. at 769-70.
48. !d.
49. Abrams, supra note 4, at 1217.
50. According to Greek myth, Procrustes was a bandit who preyed upon travelers to Athens. He
tied all the travelers he could catch to an iron bed. If they were too tall to fit into the bed, he cut off their
feet. If they were too short to fit, he stretched them until they were the right length. Procrustes was
eventually killed by Theseus. See EDITH HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY 210-l I (1942).
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forms of workplace harassment into its framework involves doing violence to
the basic concept of workplace discrimination. This article seeks to avoid the
perils of a "one-size-fits-all" theory by taking up the challenge posed by
scholars such as Franke, Abrams, and Schultz, and indeed, by going a step
further in proposing a pluralistic understanding of workplace harassment. A
pluralistic understanding emphasizes the patterned ways in which workplace
harassment differentially affects members of discrete and vulnerable groups,
particularly emphasizing the ways in which workplace harassment contributes
to the systematic exclusion of women from positions of economic and political
power. Further, this pluralistic understanding also accounts adequately for the
negative nature of all workplace harassment, regardless of the gender 1 or
sexual orientation of the harasser and the harassed and regardless of whether the
harassing behavior is sexual in nature.
The argument for a pluralistic understanding of harassment begins with two
basic premises. First, it assumes that every person has a right to be free from
abusive treatment in the workplace. The term "every person" is used advisedly:
a person's race, sex, religion, or national origin (or, for that matter, sexual
orientation, disability, height, weight, physical attractiveness, accent, eye color,
or other distinguishing characteristic) does not affect his or her basic humanity,
and no human being should be treated abusively at work. Moreover, "abusive
treatment" is used in its broad sense: treatment that-whether through intent or
through reckless or negligent disregard of the consequences-tends to humiliate, torment, threaten, intimidate, pressure, demean, frighten, or injure the
person toward whom it is directed. 52
The second premise is that societal discrimination against members of certain
historically less powerful groups is a real and serious social phenomenon that
calls out urgently for legal and policy intervention. Women have historically
faced discrimination in the workplace, this discrimination continues today, and
the workplace harassment of women is often motivated by hostility to their
presence in the workplace. 53 Even when harassment of women at work is not
directly motivated by discriminatory impulses, it may still have a disproportion-

51. In this article, I use the word "sex" and the word "gender" loosely and more or less
interchangeably. There is an extensive feminist debate about the meaning and utility of these terms. For
a short summary of this discussion, see Schultz, supra note 4, at 1686 n.8. For the limited purpose of
this article, however, I see no reason to wade into that debate, and I use the terms in their most
colloquial sense.
52. Like other similar concepts, this notion of harassment hinges on notions of severity and
reasonableness. My understanding of harassment is greatly influenced by the work of Carroll Brodsky.
See generally CARROLL M. BRODSKY, THE HARASSED WORKER (I976).
53. Cf Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 257 (1981) (plaintiff making
prima facie case shifts burden of proof to defendant to demonstrate lawful reasons for adverse
employment action); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 4II U.S. 792,804 (1973) (Title VII does not
permit use of conduct as pretext for discriminatory firing); Bums v. Gadsden State Community College,
908 F.2d 1512, 1518 (lith Cir. 1990) (evidence that defendant said lower positions were sufficient for
women and blacks sufficient to show gender played role in plaintiff not being hired).
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ately adverse impact on the workplace advancement of women. 5 4
B. DIGNITARY HARMS IN A CONTEXT OF DISCRIMINATION

In order to achieve such a pluralistic understanding of workplace harassmentone that permits us both to see why all workplace harassment is wrong
regardless of the gender of the harasser or the harassed, but that still allows us
to emphasize the patterned and discriminatory ways in which workplace harassment occurs-we must first avoid falling into the category confusion so common in sexual harassment doctrine. To avoid this confusion, the nature of the
harm of sexual harassment, on the one hand, must be distinguished from the
context in which the harm occurs, on the other.
The most fundamental harm of sexual harassment is a dignitary harm: by
humiliating, intimidating, tormenting, pressuring, or mocking individuals in
their places of work, sexual harassment is an insult to the dignity, autonomy,
and personhood of each victim; such harassment violates each individual's right
to be treated with the respect and concern that is due to her as a full and equally
valuable human being. 55 The harm of sexual harassment, then, is a dignitary
harm, closely akin to other, nonsexual, dignitary harms. But is this the end of
the story? No--for dignitary harms do not occur in a vacuum: the context in
which those dignitary harms take place is also critical to an ultimate understanding of the harm. The Twentieth Century has seen an unprecedented flow of
women both into the workforce and, in particular, into jobs previously dominated by men. 5 6 Men have resisted, often aggressively and sometimes violently,
this massive influx of women into "men's jobs. " 57 To a significant extent, when
a woman is harassed at work, her harassment needs to be seen as part of a
discriminatory backlash: a last-ditch effort by men to preserve the playgrounds
of male power from female competitors. 58 Not all workplace harassment of
women is motivated by a desire-explicit or implicit-to keep women out of
male-dominated jobs. However, failure to recognize that much-perhaps mostworkplace harassment of women is motivated by discriminatory male attitudes
would be to miss the forest for the trees. The harm of workplace sexual
harassment is a dignitary harm, but the context in which the harm occurs is a
context of discrimination against women in the workplace.
54. Cf Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
55. Cf Bernstein, supra note 23, at 450 (arguing that "hostile environment sexual harassment ... is
a type of incivility or-in the locution that I prefer-disrespect"). See also Hager, supra note 23, at 377
(arguing that "sexual harassment [should} be viewed as an offense to personal dignity and autonomy").
56. In 1900, fewer than 20% of American women were employed. In 1997, 60% were employed.
See Bureau of Labor Statistics (visited Feb. 25, 1999) <http://stats.bls.gov>.
57. See, e.g., Lynn Darling, Feminism 20 Years Later, NEWSDAY, Feb. 10, 1987, at 4; see also
Tracey L. Adams, Gender and Womens Employment in the Male-Dominated Profession of Dentistry:
1867-1917, CANADIAN REv. OF Soc. & ANTHROPOLOGY, Feb. I, 1998, at 21, 23-25 (citing studies
documenting male attempts to exclude women from a variety of occupations); Johanna Brenner, On
Gender and Class in U.S. Labor History, MoNTHLY REv., Nov. 1998, at 1.
58. See generally Schultz, supra note 4.
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Two analogies may help to clarify this distinction. Consider, first, violent
sexual assault: rape, attempted rape, and so on. The nature of the harm is clear:
such assaults are violent attacks upon the person--crimes of violence that may
cause both physical and psychological harm. In American society, the vast
majority of sexual assaults are perpetrated by men against women, 59 and ample
evidence links the prevalence of violent sexual assaults against women to more
generalized cultural denigration and objectification of women. 60 Here the harm
of sexual violence occurs within a particular context of long-standing discrimination against women.
From a policy perspective, this context is of tremendous significance. When
crafting programs designed to raise the status of women or prevent sexual
violence, speaking of the harm of sexual assault without reference to its broader
context-recognizing that most perpetrators are men and most victims womenwould be absurd.
Nonetheless, the context of the harm is not identical to the nature of the harm.
Although widespread societal denigration and objectification of women may
lead to a high number of violent sexual attacks on women, 61 violent sexual
assault is wrong because it is a violent and invasive attack upon a human being,
not because such assaults usually happen to women and usually are inflicted by
men. 62 Indeed, men, too, are sexually assaulted, but to say either that when men
are raped it is because of societal denigration of women 63 or that a man who is
raped suffers less than a woman who is raped hardly makes sense. 64 A man's
59. See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., HIV Testing, Counseling, and Prophylaxis after Sexual
Assault, 271 JAMA 1436 (1994) (noting that in 1991, there were 683,000 foreible rapes of adult women
and only about 10,000 sexual assaults on males aged 12 or older); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRJM. JUSTICE STATISTICS-1991, at 275, 756--59
(Timothy J. Hanagan & Kathleen Maguire eds., 1991) (noting that 1.0 women out of every 1000 were
victims of completed or attempted rape, compared to only 0.2 in every 1000 males).
60. See MAKING VIOLENCE SEXY: FEMINIST VIEWS ON PORNOGRAPHY (Diana Russell ed., 1993);
Jennifer Gaffney, Amending the Violence Against Women Act: Creating Rebuttable Presumption of
Gender Animus in Rape Cases, 6 J.L. & PoL'Y 247 (1997); Kim Archer, Rapists in Today's Society
Often Have a Familiar Face-And Researchers Agree Our Culture is to Blame, TuLSA WORLD, May 30,
1989, at Cl.
61. And may also lead society, police, and the courts to further harm female victims of violent
sexual assault by blaming or stigmatizing them.
62. But cf Elaine Herscher, Campaign Focuses on Abused Lesbians: Ads Deal With Usually Taboo
Subject, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., July 13, 1998, at All (noting that female-female rape is a significant
problem within the lesbian community).
63. Though, arguably, sexual assault on "effeminate" men by "masculine" men may be due to
gender stereotyping (this is parallel to the argument that effeminate men are harassed by more
"masculine" male colleagues who harass based on sexist gender stereotyping). See generally MICHAEL
SCARCE, MALE ON MALE RAPE: THE HIDDEN TOLL OF STIGMA AND SHAME 57-85 (I 997).
64. There is, on the contrary, some evidence that male rape victims may suffer as much or even
more than female rape victims. See, e.g., People v. Richard Yates, 215 N.Y.L.J. 26 (N.Y. County, First
Judicial Dep't, Jan. 4, 1996) (citing studies showing that "men are likely to be abused more violently
and by multiple attackers, to sustain more serious injuries, [and] to feel more stigmatized" than female
rape victims); see also Craig L. Anderson, Males as Sexual Assault Victims: Multiple Levels of Trauma,
in HOMOSEXUALITY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY: A PRACTITIONERS HANDBOOK OF AFFIRMATIVE MODELS 145,
148-55 (1982).
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suffering may, indeed, be "different" from a woman's in that his understanding
of what has happened to him will be filtered through his perceptions of the
social meaning of rape and masculinity. Thus, although the same context may
affect his suffering in different ways, there is no basis for claiming that he
suffers less than a woman, so any "theory" that purports to explain the harms of
sexual violence needs to take into account the fact that men as well as women
can be victims. Violent sexual assault is wrong, then, because no human being,
regardless of gender, should be violently attacked or compelled to have sexual
relations against his or her wishes.
As another example, consider the Second World War, during which an
estimated six million Jews were murdered in Nazi concentration camps. Since
the Holocaust, the world has struggled to come to terms with the murder of so
many millions and to characterize the colossal wrongness of the death camps.
Some have emphasized that the Holocaust was primarily "about" anti-Semitism
because it involved a deliberate policy of murdering all Jews who could be
found. 65 Characterizing the Holocaust as "about" anti-Semitism captures a
deep, and important, truth: the Holocaust cannot be understood without also
understanding the history of the Jews in Europe, the rise of European antiSemitism, and the deliberate exploitation and fomenting of anti-Semitic sentiment by Adolph Hitler. An understanding of the Holocaust relies on an
understanding of anti-Semitism, and an understanding of Europe's shameful
history of anti-Semitism (replete with near-constant discrimination and episodic
pogroms) likewise is necessary to prevent future discrimination or atrocities
against people of Jewish origin. 66
Characterizing the Holocaust as primarily "about" anti-Semitism captures
one deep truth, but it misses another. The Holocaust involved the systematic
brutalization and slaughter of millions of human beings-mostly Jews, but also
Poles, communists, l10mosexuals, dissidents, persons with mental and physical
disabilities, and assorted other "undesirables." The Nazis cast a wide net; they
murdered Jews because they were. Jews, but they also murdered many other
people, some because they were members of an "undesirable" group, others for
almost any reason, or for no reason at all. 67
Because the Nazis systematically ignored the value of human life and dignity,
the death camps may be characterized as representing a "crime against humanity." This phrase emphasizes two things. First, the phrase emphasizes the fact
that the millions murdered were not all Jews, even though most of them were.

65. Cf Gunter Remmling, Discrimination, Persecution, Theft, and Murder under Color of Law:
The Totalitarian Corruption of the German Legal System, 1933-1945, in GENOCIDE AND THE MoDERN
AGE 185 (1sidor Wallimann & Michael N. Dobkowski eds., 1987).
66. See generally Robert Waite, The Holocaust and Historical Explanation, in GENOCIDE AND THE
MODERN AGE, supra note 65, at 163.
67. In other words, simply because they were "inconvenient" or a threat. See generally Waite,
supra note 66; Ronald Aronson, Social Madness, in GENOCIDE AND TilE MODERN AGE, supra note 65, at
123.
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Second, and most important, it emphasizes that the death camps were wrong not
because brutalizing and killing Jews is wrong, but because Jews, along with
communists, Poles, homosexuals, and other persecuted individuals, are all
human beings and because the systematic devaluing and murder of human
beings is a deep wrong.
An analytic distinction can therefore be drawn between the nature of the
harm of the death camps and the context in which that harm occurred. The
nature of the harm, of course, has to do both with violence and with the denial
of human dignity. The context in which the harms occurred was a context of
virulent anti-Semitism. Consideration of both the nature of the harms and their
context is necessary to an understanding of the Holocaust and necessary to
prevent future events like it. Both are important, and each gets at important
truths; however, considered in isolation, neither tells the whole story. 68
C. "INDIVIDUAL" VERSUS "GROUP" HARMS

The often facile distinction between "individual harms" and "group harms"
must be problematized and broken down. 69 This distinction is, by now, a hoary
one and, for many early feminists, a valuable one. But at times-particularly in
the context of workplace harassment-the distinction can nevertheless obfuscate as mu~h as it enlightens.
1f a woman is harassed at work, it may be that she was targeted for sexual
harassment because her harasser bore a general animosity toward women in the
workplace and that her harassment was not, in this sense, "personal"; that is,
she was targeted because of the characteristics she shares with all other women,
not because of characteristics that are entirely individual and unique to her.
Nonetheless, she suffers as an individual and feels degraded or frightened or
outraged as an individual. The quality of her suffering is not altered, in some
easily predictable way, by the fact that she is a woman and that she was targeted
for harassment because of her gender.
If the victim understands that she was targeted for discriminatory reasons, her
individual suffering may worsen, for she may feel doubly undermined and
attacked, both as an individual and as a woman. Her suffering may be compounded if she feels trapped-condemned always to be targeted for an attribute
she cannot change. On the other hand, her awareness of having been targeted
68. Indeed, I would argue that an exclusive tendency among some Holocaust scholars to focus on
the harm's context (anti-Semitism) rather than the harm's nature (violence and systematic dehumanization) has been detrimental to attempts to understand and prevent the conditions that give rise to
genocide and mass killings in other circumstances. Many Holocaust scholars have insisted that the
Holocaust was sui generis in nature, a moral wrong so unique to the Jews that we cannot attempt to
compare it to other mass killings. See, e.g., Alan Rosenburg, Was the Holocaust Unique?: A Peculiar
Question, in GENOCIDE AND THE MODERN AGE, supra note 65, at 145; Waite, supra note 66. As a human
rights advocate, I find this view shortsighted, because it tends to discourage people from trying to draw
lessons from the Holocaust, lessons that, if drawn, might have helped the world prevent the atrocities in
Bosnia, Rwanda, and elsewhere.
69. See generally MACKINNON, supra note I.
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for discriminatory reasons may, instead, diminish her individual suffering,
because she may feel better able to brush off the harassment precisely because
she knows that nothing she did or could have done would have prevented it; she
may feel empowered by her awareness that she is integral to a broader struggle
to demand that all women be treated as full persons.
Distinguishing between "individual" and "group" harms has a certain analytic convenience, but in the context of workplace harassment, at least, this
distinction can conflate very different things to the detriment of doctrinal clarity
and practical advancement. More specifically, in much of the discussion of Title
VII antidiscrimination doctrine, the tendency to conceptualize sexual harassment as a "group harm" has conflated the nature of the harm of sexual
harassment, a dignitary harm, with the context in which that harm occurs: a
context of discrimination against women.
D. THE IMPORTANCE OF DISAGGREGATION

The harm of sexual harassment must be disaggregated from its context.
Otherwise, no clear and nonarbitrary basis exists for permitting some claims,
but not others, under Title VII. Moreover, disaggregating the harm and its
context points the way to a clearer vision of the wrong of all workplace
harassment, sexual or nonsexual, regardless of whether the motive for harassment is discriminatory or not. Disaggregation also permits movement away
from an essentialist paradigm of workplace harassment, which places primary
emphasis on women's differences from others, and toward an approach that
acknowledges the realities of gender-based discrimination while simultaneously
offering a dignity and equality-based paradigm for understanding harassment;
this paradigm emphasizes that women have the right to be free from workplace
harassment simply because they are human beings.
The fact that much male workplace harassment of women arises out of
hostility to the presence of women in traditionally male domains has deep
implications for policy and prevention. Nonetheless, we need an understanding
of workplace harassment that can encompass both discriminatory harassment of
women, by men, and all other kinds of workplace harassment as well-whether
the harassment is directed at women or men, by women or men, whether
motivated by discriminatory animus or not, 70 and whether sexual in nature or
not.
Disaggregating the nature of the harm of workplace harassment from the
context of the harm allows for an articulation of what is wrong with instances of
70. One could argue, of course, that all workplace harassment of women should be seen as per se
discrimination, because the workplace harassment of any woman makes it harder for women-as a
historically disadvantaged class-to advance in the workplace. This question is about adverse impact:
does the cumulative effect of many instances of workplace harassment of women-even if none of the
instances is motivated by hostility to women as a group--add up to de facto discrimination, because
even such facially nondiscriminatory harassment occurs in a context in which women have long faced
discrimination? This is a complex question and, again, one that is beyond the scope of this discussion.
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harassment that do not fit into the classic paradigm, specifically instances of
harassment that do not involve men harassing women. 71 Focusing on the
dignitary harms of workplace sexual harassment also allows for movement
beyond a narrow focus on sexualized harassment. Understanding sexual harassment as a dignitary harm that insults the dignity, autonomy, and personhood of
the victim makes easier a view that sexualized harassment is not the only way a
harasser can insult his victim's dignity and personhood: many nonsexualized
behaviors can also degrade, frighten, and torment. 72
Disaggregation is important for another reason, as well; when faced with the
classic sexual harassment paradigm, in which a woman is sexually harassed by
a man, disaggregating the harm from its context reveals a critical moral and
political point, one that emphasizes what all humans, male and female, have in
common, rather than emphasizing an essentialist vision in which men and
women are forever different and opposed. 73
Male sexual harassment of women is, indeed, part of a broad problem of
societal discrimination against women. However, male sexual harassment of
women is not wrong because women are uniquely vulnerable to men, because
men are always vulgar and loutish, or because women have "special" sensitivities and rights that men do not share. These essentialist assumptions are fostered
by the tendency of many commentators to emphasize the context of sexual
harassment over the nature of harms (or, put differently, to emphasize that it is a
"group harm" rather than an "individual harm").
Such essentialist misunderstandings of the wrong of sexual harassment have
contributed to a growing societal backlash against women who complain of
sexual harassment. 74 Emphasizing the dignitary nature of the harm of sexual
harassment instead of focusing exclusively on its discriminatory context can do
a great deal to diminish the strength of this backlash. By focusing on the nature
of the harm of sexual harassment, sexual harassment is viewed as wrong not
because it wrongs women, but because such treatment would deeply wrong any
human being, regardless of sex. 75

7 I. It may be helpful to imagine two circles, one contained by the other. Label the outside circle,
"actions that cause dignitary harm," and label the inside circle, "discriminatory actions." In some
sense, all discriminatory actions involve the infliction of dignitary harms, making discrimination a
subset of dignitary harm. However, not all actions that cause dignitary barm are discriminatory.
72. Cf Schultz, supra note 4 (discussing the dangers of what she calls the "desire-based paradigm"
for understanding the workplace harassment of women).
73. Cf Franke, supra note 4, at 760 (critiquing MacKinnon's "subordination theory" of sexual
harassment on grounds that it relies "too heavily on the premise that [sexual harassment] is something
that men, as a biological category, do to women, as a biological category").
74. Consider, for instance, David Mamet's successful play Oleanna, which depicts a female student
who falsely accuses a male professor of sexual harassment. See Nelson Pressley, "Oleanna" Deals a
One-two Punch Right to PC's Glass Jaw, WASH. TIMES, Apr. I, 1996, at Cl I; cf Abrams, supra note 4,
at 1176 (warning of dangers of "reinforcing the all-too-prevalent belief that [sexual harassment] is a
women's injury that cannot be apprehended by the rest of the population").
75. Cf J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2367 (1997) (arguing that
"when we interpret civil rights in terms of status groups, we replace the inquiry into discrimination
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LOOKING TO THE COMMON LAW

A. THE CONCEPT OF DIGNITARY HARM

The common law of tort poses a promising way to understand and address the
many forms of workplace harassment. Modem tort law embraces the concept of
"dignitary harm," a harm that injures "personality interests" rather than one's
physical well-being. 76 While the common-law notion of harm to one's dignity
or personality interests may not bear intense philosophical scrutiny, its core
assumptions are clear enough: all individuals share in "personhood," are autonomous and unique, and are entitled to be treated with respect. Actions that would
humiliate, torment, threaten, intimidate, pressure, demean, frighten, outrage, or
injure a reasonable person77 are actions that can be said to injure an individual's
dignitary interests and, if sufficiently severe, can give rise to causes of action in
tort.
The application of modem tort law to workplace harassment is probably best
understood by a brief description of some of the torts currently recognized as
having to do with dignitary harms. 78 Consider, first, the intentional torts:
assault, battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, all of which are designed to provide redress for mental disturbances
such as "fright, revulsion [and] humiliation. " 79
A "battery" is "a harmful or offensive contact with a person," made with
intent. 80 The Restatement of Torts comments that for the purposes of this tort,
"a bodily contact is offensive if it offends a reasonable sense of personal
dignity" and is "unwarranted by the social usages prevalent at the time and
place at which it is inflicted." 81
"Assault," which, according to Prosser and Keeton, goes together with
battery "like ham and eggs," is "an act of such a nature as to excite an

based on immutable traits with an inquiry into systems of social meaning and status hierarchy");
Bernstein, supra note 23, at 455 (arguing, somewhat analogously, that using her concept of "respectful
person" to assess Title VII hostile environment sexual harassment claims is beneficial in part because it
"comes close to gender neutrality"). But see Abrams, supra note 4, at 1185-86 (critiquing dangers of
overly gender-neutral standard).
76. See generally Bernstein, supra note 23; Robert Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy:
Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REv. 957 (1989).
77. I am aware of the extensive feminist debate about the concept of "reasonableness," but I see
that debate as beyond the scope of this article. For a feminist critique of the concept, see Bernstein,
supra note 23, at 453-87.
78. Because my argument in this article is general, rather than focused on the law of any particular
state, I do not attempt to go beyond those paradigmatic torts discussed in the REsTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. Needless to say, not all states accept the Restatement in its
entirety, and states vary greatly in the torts they recognize and their willingness to develop "new" torts
or to read new meanings into existing tort causes of action.
79. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 40 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PRossER].
80. /d. at 39.
81. REsTATEMENT, supra note 78, § 19 cmt. a.
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apprehension of a battery." 82 Prosser and Keeton regard the torts of assault and
battery as entitling plaintiffs to "protection according to the usages of decent
society, and offensive contacts, or those which are contrary to all good manners,
need not be tolerated." 83
The tort of false imprisonment also involves emotional distress and dignitary
barm, creating a cause of action when a person is confined against her will. In
application, the tort is fairly broad; it protects plaintiffs who have been forced to
stay in a room by a person who physically bars their exit, even if only for a
relatively short period, just as it protects plaintiffs who literally have been
wrongly confined in a prison cell.
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is equally broad. 84
According to the Restatement of Torts, "[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous
conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is
subject to liability for such emotional distress." 85 At the time of the Restatement
of Torts, most jurisdictions applied different standards to agents of common
carriers, inns, and public utilities on the one hand and to ordinary defendants on
the other. For an ordinary defendant to be liable for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress, the distress induced had to be severe, beyond "mere insult,
indignity, annoyance, or even threats . . . lacking in other circumstances of
aggravation." 86 For agents of common carriers and the like, however, who are
deemed to have "special obligations to the public," language which is "merely
profane, or indecent, or grossly insulting to people of ordinary sensibility" is
enough to give rise to liability. 87
The intentional torts are not the only tort causes of action that protect
dignitary interests. The torts of invasion of privacy and defamation do so as
well. "Invasion of privacy" is usually deemed to consist of four distinct
sub-torts: the wrongful appropriation of an individual's name or image, unreasonable intrusion upon an individual's seclusion ("seclusion" here applies to an
individual's body as well as his or her home or private concerns), the public
disclosure of private facts about an individual, and publicity that places an
individual in "a false light" in the public eye. 88 The tort of defamation has to do
with "an invasion of the interest in reputation and good name" and consists of
two sub-torts: libel and slander. Both libel and slander involve the commuuication to third parties of information that would tend "to injure 'reputation' in the
popular sense; to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill, or confidence in which
the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or
82. PRossER, supra note 79, at 46.
83. /d. at 42.
84. See, e.g., Pease v. Alford Photo Indus., 667 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. Tenn. 1987) (female employee
entitled to compensatory and punitive damages on claims of assault and battery, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and outrageous conduct for quid pro quo harassment).
85. REsTATEMENT, supra note 78, at§ 46.
86. PRossER, supra note 79, at 59 (citations omitted).
87. /d. at 58 (citations omitted).
88. See generally id. at 849-69.
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opinions against him." 89 Libel is the "publication of defamatory matters" in
writing or other permanent form; slander is essentially spoken defamation. 90
All of these tort causes of action rest on certain underlying assumptions about
human dignity, privacy, and personality-assumptions that the courts rarely
seek to justify or even articulate, but that they make nonetheless. These assumptions are familiar to us from constitutional jurisprudence: in Goldberg v. Kelly, 91
the Supreme Court declared, "From its founding the Nation's basic commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its
borders." 92 Abortion cases generally fall back upon notions of human dignity as
well: thus, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 93 the Court noted that decisions
relating to marriage and procreation are "choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy. " 94 In the realm of criminal justice, the Court has also insisted that
human dignity is an essential concept; each individual must "be evaluated as a
unique human being," the dissent declared in McCleskey v. Kemp. 95 In Miranda
v. Arizona,96 the Court spoke of the government's obligation to respect "the
dignity and integrity of its citizens." 97
In First Amendment jurisprudence, the concern is the same: "The right of a
man to the protection of his own reputation from unjustified invasion and
wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity
and worth of every human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of
ordered liberty," commented Justice Stewart in Rosenblatt v. Baer. 98 The Court
has been equally clear that "human dignity" implies an individual's right to
control the boundaries of the self. In United States v. White, 99 the Court noted,
"The individual must keep some facts concerning his thoughts within a small
zone of people. At the same time he must be free to pour out his woes or
inspirations or dreams to others. He remains the sole judge as to what must be
said and what must remain unspoken." 100
In U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, these assumptions about personhood and
dignity are, perhaps, best understood as imports from a centuries-old commonlaw tradition; within the common-law tradition, they can be best understood as
norms about how individuals should behave and how communities should

89. /d. at 773 (citations omitted).
90. /d. at 785-87.
91. 397 u.s. 254 (1970).
92. /d. at 264-65.
93. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
94. /d. at 851.
95. 481 U.S. 279, 336 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
239 (1972).
96. 84 u.s. 436 (1966).
97. /d. at 460.
98. 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
99. 401 u.s. 745 (1971).
100. /d. at 763; cf BRUCE AcKERMAN, Temporal Horizons of Injustice, in THE JOURNAL OF
PHILOSOPHY 306 (1999) ("We require a new idea-that justice requires us to respect each others' right
to tell stories of a certain kind about our ongoing relationships.").

1999]

DIGNITY AND DISCRIMINATION

25

function. To articulate and defend a philosophically coherent notion of "personhood" or "dignity" may or may not be possible. However, the application of
tort conceptions of "dignity" to workplace harassment rests not on an argument
that courts should adopt a particular conception of human dignity and personality, but instead rests on a recognition that courts simply do assume that human
beings have a certain inherent dignity and that this dignity may not be violated,
either by the state or by other private individuals. 101 Further, a real connection
exists between the assumptions about human dignity made by the courts and the
assumptions about human dignity that most Americans hold. 102
This project of discussing the assumptions inherent in the tort causes of
action mentioned above is descriptive; indeed, in a deep sense, the project of the
common law itself is descriptive. 103 As Robert Post observed, "the common
law attempts not to search out and articulate first ethical principles, as would a
certain kind of moral philosopher, but instead to discover and refresh the social
norms by which we live." 104 The common law assumes both that there is such a
thing as human dignity and that human dignity requires that each individual
have substantial control over what may be called the "boundaries of the
self." 105 Most obviously, human dignity requires that people be able to control
other people's access to their physical selves. The boundaries of their physical
selves, of course, are protected by the existence of causes of action for assault
and battery (and, to some extent, by the tort of invasion of privacy).
Human dignity in the common-law sense, however, also requires the mainte101. For a discussion of the common law heritage of the closely related concept of "respect," see
Bernstein, supra note 23. Bernstein also argues that the common law acknowledges a general "duty not
to humiliate," which "requires the agent to consider the dignity of the other and refrain from injuring
that dignity." /d. at 490; see also Jeremy Waldron, On Humiliation, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1787, 1792
(1995).
102. I do not seek here to put forth a general theory about the relationship between the common
law and social norms, although I take it for granted that the common law both reflects widely held
norms and, in turn, can foster changes in widely held norms. See generally Post, supra note 76. For a
discussion of the ways in which law interacts with social norms, see LAW AND WARFARE: STUDIES IN
THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF CONFLJCf (Paul Bohann ed., 1967) and Lawrence J. Friedman, The Concept of
Legal Culture: A Reply, in CoMPARATIVE LEGAL CULTURES 33-35 (David Nelke ed., 1987).
103. By saying that the common law's project is descriptive in a deep sense, I do not mean to
dispute the notion that judges do "make law" as well as describe it. As noted in note 102, I agree fully
that the common law both reflects social norms and can alter social norms, and creative judges go about
this process in a self-conscious fashion. Again, I do not pretend to have a full-fledged theory of how
law reflects and changes social norms. Intuitively, however, I assume that even when judges try
self-consciously to alter social norms through progressive opinions, they cannot simply pluck their
reasoning out of thin air: to have any long-term effect, it needs to be linked, at least, to social norms that
are already emerging.
104. Post, supra note 76, at 970; see also Jane E. Larson, "Imagine Her Satisfaction": The
Transformative Task of Feminist Tort Work, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 56, 69 (I 993) (noting that the common
law is "built upon social custom and experience rather than upon abstract ideals"); cf 2 JOEL FEINBERG,
ON HARM AND THE MoRAL LiMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAw: OFFENSE To OTHERS (1985).
105. Cf Bernstein, supra note 23, at 491 (noting that concepts of personhood have to do with "the
boundaries that separate individuals from one another"). For a discussion of the notion of boundaries
and inviolability, see Linda McClain, Inviolability and Privacy: The Castle, The Sanctuary, and the
Body, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 195 (I 995).
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nance of control over "personality," the intangible, nonphysical aspects of the
self. From this common-law notion of "inviolate personality," Warren and
Brandeis derived the tort of invasion of privacy, which they saw as "part of the
general right to the immunity of the person-the right to one's personality." 106
To another commentator, the common law notion of privacy (in the broad sense,
rather than in the narrow sense of the tort) is "control over when and by whom
the various parts of us can be sensed by others." 107
The tort causes of action discussed above contain a cluster of associated
ideas: dignity, autonomy, personhood and personality, selfhood, privacy, decency, respect, and so on. In the common law, these ideas tend not to be defined
abstractly; their contours become most apparent in their breach. Opposed to the
notions of dignity and personhood are notions of invasion, intrusion, outrage,
affront, insult, incivility, humiliation, and degradation. To Robert Post, the
common law allows recovery for violations of the "rules of decency" acknowledged by reasonable people, because it recognizes that such violations "damage
a person by discrediting his identity and injuring his personality." 108 Similarly,
Prosser and Keeton, discussing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, note that "[s]o far as it is possible to generalize from the cases, the rule
which seems to have emerged is that there is liability for conduct exceeding all
bounds usually tolerated by decent society." 109
It is tempting to try to define and clarify the fuzzy notion of the "boundaries
of the self." Such a definition might begin with a statement that certain kinds of
issues-sexuality, intimate family relationships, personal character flaws, deeply
held religious beliefs, personal finances, and personal appearance-are all
"private" and should be off limits to all but intimate associates at all times.
However, exceptions are easily imagined; there are situations in which probing
in these areas is not merely accepted but approved. To state the obvious, "rules
of decency" are context-dependent. Few kinds of behavior are "always" an
affront to human dignity, llO and efforts to map out the private territory that is
"off limits" generally fall down when confronted with context-specific examples. Behavior that is appropriate at a party or a singles bar might be deeply
inappropriate and offensive to a reasonable person at a funeral-or in the
workplace. A question that is not intrusive when asked by a close friend or even

106. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 205, 207
(1890).
107. Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REv. 275, 281 (1974).
108. Post, supra note 76, at 963.
109. PRossER, supra note 79, at 60.
110. In this discussion, I use the notion of "affront to human dignity" in the civil, rather than the
quasi-criminal sense. As students of human rights law know, certain particularly egregious behaviors
will be deemed always to violate human dignity, regardless of context: the use of torture, for instance, is
proscribed by customary international law, and is considered to be so deeply violative of human dignity
that "no exceptional circumstance whatsoever" (including wartime threats, etc.) can justify it. See, e.g.,
United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Part I, Art. 2(2), U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (1984).
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by a new social acquaintance might reasonably be deemed offensive when
asked by a stranger at the bus stop or by one's boss at work.
In Post's formulation, then, common-law cases involving dignitary harms are
not about delineating abstract boundaries, but about "characterizing social
norms"; a plaintiff is entitled to relief if the defendant "has transgressed the
kind of social norms whose violation would properly be viewed with outrage
and affront ... [for] the integrity of individual personality is dependent upon the
observance of certain kinds of social norms." 111
B. THE RELEVANCE OF THE TORT NOTION OF DIGNITARY HARM
TO WORKPLACE HARASSMENT

1. Relevance to Sexual Harassment in the Paradigmatic Sense
When we think about sexual harassment cases, the relevance of these commonlaw notions of human dignity-and therefore tort causes of action like assault,
battery, invasion of privacy, false imprisonment, defamation, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress-should be obvious at once. The harm of sexual
harassment is i!l many ways a quintessential dignitary harm: 112 paradigmatic
cases of sexual harassment involve the transgression of social norms involving
the boundaries of both the physical self and the "personality." 113 Sexual
harassment subjects an individual to behavior that violates basic standards of
decency and privacy; rather than choosing the people with whom she will
become intimate, the victim of sexual harassment has sexual intimacies forced
upon her by her harasser. 114 This distinction is true whether the intimacies are
physical or verbal because sexual harassment, by its nature, takes from the
victim the right to be "sole judge as to what must be said and what must remain
unspoken." 115
If the harm of sexual harassment is a dignitary harm, then these torts offer
potential remedies, above and beyond any that might be offered by Title VII.
Ill. Post, supra note 76, at 962.
112. Numerous judicial opinions have noted that sexual harassment humiliates the victim. See, e.g.,
Ascolese v. Southeastern Penn. Transp. Auth., 925 F. Supp. 351, 360-61 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Williams v.
Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 655-56 (D.D.C. 1976), vacated sub. nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240
(D.C. Cir. 1978); Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995).
113. Cf Abrams, supra note 4, at 1220 (noting that sexual harassment "interferes with the capacity
to both define oneself as a subject and seek less stereotypic and confining roles").
114. Cf Bernstein, supra note 23, at 450 ("Hostile environment sexual harassment ... is a type of
incivility or-in the locution that I prefer-disrespect."). Bernstein is concerned primarily with Title
VII, but she argues that creating a "respectful person" standard for assessing hostile environment
sexual harassment claims under Title VII also gives "content to the ... ideal of individual autonomy
behind dignitary tort law." /d.
115. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 763 (1971); cf Ackerman, supra note lOO (noting that
"we should look to the way the work environment suppresses a fundamental human capacity-the
capacity to project the meaning of one's life over time by telling a story that includes meaningful
participation in relationships. Without such a capacity, it would simply be impossible to live a human
life. A social environment that denies a woman this possibility strikes at a crucial dimension of human
dignity... ").
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Consider, for example, a hypothetical:
Jane works at Big Boy Industries, a diversified company that manufactures
guns, race cars, cigars, and whisky. Her supervisor, Ed, comes to her one day
as she is leaving the supply closet and says, "I sure like your dress, gal! Are
you wearing a bra?" Jane tries to step past Ed, but he blocks the way. "I just
want to see if you have a bra on," chortles Ed. "And undies-you got them
on?" Jane tries again to step past Ed, who again blocks the way. "Cut it out,
Ed-leave me alone!" says Jane. "Oh no," says Ed. "If you won't tell me if
you're wearing underwear, I'll just have to look for myself." With that, he
pushes Jane back into the supply closet and grabs at her clothes, trying to
push them aside. Jane yells, loudly, and a passerby calls out, "Anything
wrong?" Ed abruptly lets go of Jane, and she manages to rush past him.
In the days and weeks that follow, Ed launches a vendetta against Jane. He
follows her around at work, mocking her. He rifles through her belongings
and leaves pornographic materials on her desk. She overhears him telling
coworkers that she's "an ugly, man-hating bitch, and she'll say anything to
get a man in trouble." He informs coworkers that Jane has been married-and
divorced-four times, which is not true, and theorizes that this fictitious
disastrous marital history is because "she can't keep a man." Jane soon finds
that many of her coworkers avoid her or, worse, also begin to sneer at her.
Although Jane repeatedly asks Ed to stop, he pays no attention, even
though his persecution often leaves her angry and upset. Jane also complains
repeatedly to another member of the supervisory staff at Big Boy Industries,
who promises to look into the situation, but nothing changes at all. One day,
after complaining vociferously about Ed's actions, Jane arrives at work to find
that Ed has taken a photo of a nude woman, put a picture of Jane's head on
top of it, and posted copies of this on all the company's bulletin boards, with
the caption, "Sluts shouldn't tell lies."

The hypothetical may sound exaggerated, but compared to the facts of many
real sexual harassment cases, it is not a particularly extreme example of what
many women endure in the workplace. 116 And "Jane," were she real, could
assert multiple tort-based causes of action against Ed and Big Boy Industries.
Consider, as background, assumptions made about the kinds of behavior that
are expected in the workplace. When going to work, employees expect to enter
a realm in which their treatment will be based on their job descriptions. 117 To
116. See cases discussed infra Part III.D.
117. It could be said that we assume a particular "role" when we go to work, and the contours of
that role are defined by our job descriptions. In a deep sense, we rarely expose our "full selves" to
others; we are always assuming one role or another. Some would say, in fact, that the notion of a full, or
"true," self is nonsense, because the self simply is a collection of roles and relations: in this sense,
having our "selfhood" or "personhood" respected simply involves having others respect our right to
choose which role we will assume on any given occasion. If we alter our persona, or role, depending
upon the circumstances and the nature of our relations with others, it is clear that another person's
refusal to respect our choice of roles is, in the deepest possible way, an attack upon our "selfhood."
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the extent that employees are judged by others, they expect to be judged based
on whether or not they are doing their jobs well, not on attractiveness, sex or
race, or wiilingness to discuss the most intimate aspects of their lives. While we
may expect to make friends-and perhaps even form intimate relationshipswith people we meet in the workplace, we assume that they have no more right
to query us on non-work-related issues than any stranger standing next to us at
the bus stop, unless and until we signal to them that a different kind of behavior
would be acceptable. 118
Returning to the facts given in the hypothetical, Ed's demand to look for
himself to determine whether Jane wore underwear, accompanied by his gestures, might reasonably be viewed as assault by a jury. A jury could certainly
take the view that Ed's actions would have "[offended] a reasonable sense of
personal dignity," in the sense of the Restatement of Torts and were clearly
"unwarranted by the social usages prevalent at the time and place at which
[they were] inflicted." 119 Ed's subsequent pushing and grabbing would likely be
seen by a court as constituting battery and, probably, invasion of privacy-an
intrusion into the physical boundaries of the self. Ed's refusal to let Jane out of
the supply closet could constitute false imprisonment. Rifling through Jane's
belongings could also be said to constitute invasion of privacy, and telling false
stories about Jane's marital history might be seen as constituting "false light"
invasion of privacy as well as slander, because it could have-and apparently
did-damage Jane's "reputation and good name." Ed's posting of the nude
photo with Jane's face above it might similarly constitute "false light" invasion
of privacy as well as the wrongful appropriation of her image and libel.
In whole, Ed's actions can also be said to constitute intentional infliction of
emotional distress: his actions might well be viewed by a reasonable person as
extending far beyond "mere insult, indignity or annoyance." 120 Jane would
likely have a strong cause of action against Ed, and also against Big Boy
Industries, because whether an agency standard or a negligence standard is
applied, Big Boy is likely to be deemed liable for Jane's dignitary injuries.

118. This notion of signaling is of course critical and merits more attention than I can give it in this
article. Obviously, we cannot and do not expect coworkers simply to announce one day, "I consider
you a friend as well as a coworker, and from now on you should feel free to ask me about my most
intimate relationships." Most relationships-at work and elsewhere-are far more fluid than that, and
the signals sent are far more subtle. This subtlety naturally leads to a great many innocent misunderstandings: one person may genuinely, but wrongly, believe that greater intimacy would be welcomed by a
coworker.
This makes assessing tort claims extremely fact-dependent, and, on the margins, extraordinarily
difficult. Nonetheless, although cases on the margins may be difficult to assess, the typical workplace
sexual harassment scenario presents us with far more clear cut examples of behavior that a reasonable
person would deem inappropriate. As I will discuss later, of course, "inappropriate" behavior does not
always (and should not always) give rise to liability; assessing liability involves complex judgments
about the degree of inappropriateness and harm, given the context.
119. REsTATEMENT, supra note 78, § 19 cmt. a.
120. PRosSER, supra note 79, at 59; see also, e.g., Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580 (Ariz. 1987).
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2. From Sexual Harassment to an Expansive Concept of Workplace Harassment
The language of the Restatement of Torts does not privilege sexual harms
over nonsexual harms. In fact, much, if not most, of the case law on these torts
concerns nonsexual harms. While the applicability of these common-law causes
of action to "classic" situations of workplace sexual harassment is self-evident,
the causes of action would be equally applicable both to less common kinds of
sexual harassment (for instance, same-sex sexual harassment) and to workplace
harassment that is not sexual in nature. Consider another hypothetical:
Albert, a white male, works as a busboy in a restaurant. One day, he drops a
tray. His supervisor, Bill-also a white male-shouts at him in front of
several coworkers and customers, saying, "Albert, you stupid moron! You're
an ugly, fat slob and don't deserve this job! I've never had anyone this stupid
and incompetent work here before!"
From that day on, Bill singles Albert out for abuse. Although Albert's
coworkers tell him that he does his job as well as-or better than-any other
busboy, Bill repeatedly shouts at him in the presence of others, always making
negative comments about his intelligence, coordination, physical appearance,
and body odor and shouting that Albert is lazy, greedy, obese, and weak.
When Albert's girlfriend comes to pick him up one day, Bill tells her (in front
of the other busboys), "Too bad you're involved with such a smelly, pathetic,
incompetent, mewling moron!" Bill's taunts often reduce Albert to near tears.
Wben Albert protests to Bill about his treatment, Bill curses at him, grabs
him by the shirt-collar, and says, "I do as I goddamn please, and you keep
your mouth shut about it or I'll kick your fat ass!" Looking Albert up and
down, he says, "You're so fat, it's disgusting! I bet you have ugly rolls of fat
all over you-let's see!" Saying that, he tears open Albert's shirt, looks him
over, scornfully, and says, "Yup, too greedy and stupid to figure out how to
diet." Albert complains to Bill's superiors, who refuse to discipline Bill or
transfer Albert. Eventually, Albert quits.

This, like the earlier hypothetical, may seem extreme. Empirical research
indicates, however, that this scenario too is hardly atypical. 121 Indeed, a recent
survey by the International Labour Organization found that "bullyingtargeting an employee for intimidation-and mobbing-ganging up on an
employee-are among the fastest growing complaints of American work-

121. It is difficult to state the frequency of such workplace harassment-a recent Bureau of Labor
Statistics Survey suggested that up to 58% of harassment and 43% of threats in the workplace are never
reported to management-but what evidence there is suggests that workplace harassment is widespread. See, e.g., Jennifer LeClaire, Psychological Violence Threatens Workplace Performance, OFFICE.
coM/DA!LY NEws AND TRENDS (Dec. 22, 1998) <www.bullybusters.org/home/twdlbb/press/of fice.html>;
BEVERLY H. PATRICK, UNCIVIL WARS: MEN, WOMEN, AND OFFICE ETIQUETIE IN THE 1990s (1997);
Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1', 52 (1998) (arguing that workplace abuse is "sufficiently concrete,
widespread, systemic, destructive, and avoidable to warrant political and judicial reform").
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ers." 122 Even serious physical violence is hardly unknown in the workplace.
The Department of Labor reported that there were 912 workplace homicides in
1996, and the Center for Disease Control declared workplace homicide a
"serious public health epidemic." 123 For many workers, especially, but not
exclusively, blue-collar and service workers, 124 going to work involves checking one's dignity at the door-subjecting oneself to a daily round of taunts and
abuse about issues unrelated to legitimate questions of work performance.
Although the workplace may be thought of as a site of liberation and growth,
for many Americans the workplace is a site of daily humiliation and misery,
endured out of economic necessity.
Obviously, Albert might assert numerous common-law causes of action
against Bill. Bill's comments about his stupidity, laziness, greed, and so on
might be considered defamatory by a jury: "they could certainly be deemed to
diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence" in which Albert is held
and "excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against
him." 125 Bill grabbed Albert by the shirt collar and threatened to kick his "fat
ass" unless Albert stopped complaining of his abusive treatment, and Bill then
ripped open Albert's shirt buttons. A jury could certainly find this action to be
an "offensive contact ... contrary to all good manners." 126 Bill could be said to
have committed assault and battery, as well as invasion of privacy. In whole,
Bill's behavior might well be viewed by a jury as constituting intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 127 To the extent that Bill's acts were within the
122. Jessica Guynn, Hostility at Work: Couple Launches Campaign to Stop Incivility On the Job,
AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Nov. 5, 1998, at Dl; see also Stephanie Armour, Running of the Bullies:
Trampling Workplace Morale and Productivity, Offenders Can Spread Ill Will From the Top Down,
USA TODAY, Sept. 9, 1998, at lB.
123. New Prevention Program Targets Rise in Workplace Violence, Bus. WIRE, Oct. 16, 1997.
124. Cf Austin, supra note 121, at 3-5 (noting Ihat when we consider the work experiences of
"black and Latin employees of bolh sexes, and female workers ... all of whom occupy Ihe lower tiers
of Ihe labor force ... " we find Ihat " [m]embers of Ihese groups share a historical experience of abusive
supervision. For Ihem, it is not isolated and sporadic rudeness, but a pervasive phenomenon Ihat causes
and perpetuates economic and social harm as well as emotional injury"); see also id. at 13 ("Status
group characteristics can sometimes increase Ihe amount of abusive behavior a worker must tolerate.
More endurance is expected from males in general and from blue-collar workers in particular."). To Ihe
extent that certain workplaces (i.e., blue-collar workplaces) are more routinely abusive Ihan olhers,
employers faced wilh tort claims involving worker harassment might be tempted to argue Ihat a
"tough" climate is standard in that industry, for all or most workers, and· their behavior Iherefore
conforms to accepted industry custom or practice. It seems to rue Ihat such a claim should be deemed to
have little relevance: as we know from olher areas of tort law (i.e., negligence), Ihe fact that an unsafe
or negligent practice is standard in an industry does not let a defendant off Ihe hook.
125. PRossER, supra note 79, § 112 at 785-797.
126. /d. at 42.
127. Cf Austin, supra note 121, at 3-4. Austin argues Ihat employers routinely make use of
behaviors intended to induce emotional distress in order to control subordinates belonging to disempowered but threatening elhnic and gender groups (e.g., African-Americans, Latin workers, and women).
See id. She examines the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress as a potential remedy for
such employer behavior. She notes that courts have been reluctant to construe this tort flexibly in Ihe
employment context, but argues for its broad application. 1 Ihink Austin casts her net too broadly: many
of Ihe workplace behaviors Austin would like to prevent are relatively mild forms of unpleasantness
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scope of his employment or that his employer knew or should have known of
the harassment but failed to intervene, Albert's employer might also be liable
for Bill's tortious acts.
C. THE ROAD NOT TAKEN

Using tort causes of action appears to offer a promising way to approach
workplace harassment. One might wonder, then, why most commentators instead made Title VII the sole focus of the debate about sexual harassment. 128
1. Early Feminist Arguments Against a Tort-Based Approach
Catharine MacKinnon considered the possibility of common-law tort remedies for sexual harassment in her 1979 book, Sexual Harassment of Working
Women, but she quickly rejected the idea. 129 At the time MacKinnon wrote,
"sexual harassment," as a concept, barely existed outside of feminist circles; to
the extent people thought about it, it was considered an isolated problem
analogous to other forms of rudeness.
MacKinnon's book, more than any other single work, helped establish that
the behaviors now thought of as sexual harassment occurred in patterned
ways-that is, most of the time, men harassed women-and that sexual harassment of women in the workplace was part of a broader pattern of male attempts
to dominate women and prevent them from gaining access to social and
economic power: sexual harassment "perpetuates the interlocked structure by
which women have been kept sexually in thrall to men and at the bottom of the
labor market." 130 To MacKinnon, sexual harassment "makes of women's sexuality a badge of servitude" 131 and "limits women in a way men are not limited.
lt deprives them of opportunities that are available to male employees without
sexual conditions." 132
MacKinnon viewed as critical an understanding of sexual harassment as
something that was done to women by men, not as something that occasionally
happened to be done to a particular woman by a particular man. Sexual
harassment happens "because one is a woman, rather than [because one is] a
person who just happens·to be a woman." 133 Thus, MacKinnon distinguished
between individual harms and group harms; to MacKinnon, sexual harassment
was the quintessential group harm.
To MacKinnon, traditional tort law, almost by its very nature, was ill-suited
that should not, in my view, be actionable, however regrettable we may find them. Cf PRossER, supra
note 79, at 56 (noting that "it would be absurd for the law to seek to secure universal peace of mind,
and many interferences with it must of necessity be left to other agencies of social control").
128. In part, the preference for Title VII may refiect a scholarly bias in favor of federal law.
129. See MAcKINNoN, supra note l. For a discussion of MacKinnon's reasons for rejecting tort
approaches to sexual harassment, see Chamallas, supra note 7, at 516.
I30. MACKiNNON, supra note 1, at 174.
13I. /d.
132. ld. at 193.
133. /d. at 192.
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for recognizing such "group harms." As MacKinnon commented, "[B]y treating the incidents [of sexual harassment] as if they are outrages particular to an
individual woman rather than integral to her social status as a woman worker,
the personal approach on the legal level fails to analyze the relevant dimensions
of the problem." 134 With its emphasis on individual behavior-individual intent
or negligence, and individual suffering-tort law seemed poorly equipped as a
means of pointing out that sexual harassment was part of large-scale male
backlash against women in the workplace. To the typical judge, such arguments
smacked of paranoid feminist conspiracy theories and had little relevance to
proving the elements of a cause of action.
For instance, torts such as the intentional infliction of emotional distress
required plaintiffs to show that the conduct that led to their emotional distress
was truly "outrageous" and would be so to a reasonable person. Early attempts
to litigate using this tort met with little success: what was so outrageous about a
dirty joke or a crude proposition, judges and juries tended to wonder? 135 Early
plaintiffs who complained about such behavior tended to be viewed as abnormally thin-skinned by male judges who could not see why come-ons, however
crude, should not be seen as compliments and who could not understand why
women should not just have to put up with dirty jokes if they wanted to participate in
a male world. The common law showed little ability to take into account broad
socio-historical changes like the massive influx of women into the workplace and
showed less ability to understand that while one crude proposition to one woman on
the job might not be earth-shattering, when thousands of women faced this in the
workplace everyday, the series of comments could become a significant bar to
the workplace happiness and advancement of women as a group.
As many commentators have noted, tbe mythical "reasonable person" of the
common law changes his (usually his) mind only very slowly, 136 and in 1979,
little reason seemed to exist to think that tort law would ever be progressive or
flexible enough to compensate women for sexual harassment. As MacKinnon
ruefully noted, common-law remedies seemed inadequate to address "the social
reality of men's sexual treatment of women[;] ... although the facts of sex
discrimination have a long history in women's suffering, the prohibition on sex
discrimination as such lacks a common law history." 137
2. Turning to Title VII
To many feminists, a statutory approach to sexual harassment seemed more
promising. But early attempts to litigate sexual harassment cases under Title VII
met with as little success as tort approaches, because judges tended to view
134. /d. at 88.
135. Cf Reed v. Maley, 74 S.W. 1079 (Ky. 1903).
136. See, e.g., Martha Charnallas, Writing About Sexual Harassment: A Guide to the Literature, 4
UCLA WOMEN's L.J. 37 (1993) (citing a number of feminist critiques of the "reasonableness"
standard).
137. MACKINNON, supra note I, at 161.
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sexually harassing behavior as arising out of the "personal proclivities" of the
harasser, rather than out of the discriminatory policies of the employer. Thus, in
Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, 138 decided in 1975, the court declared that "[b]y his
alleged sexual advances," the harasser "was satisfying a personal urge. Certainly no employer policy is here involved." 139 The following year, in Tomkins
v. Public ·Service Electric & Gas Co., 140 the judge found that the sexual
advances complained of by the plaintiff were the result of "natural sexual
· attraction" and noted that "if plaintiff's view were to prevail ... an invitation to
dinner could become an invitation to a federal lawsuit." 141
Nonetheless, Title VII continued to seem, to feminists, an appropriate tool for
sexual harassment test cases, and the end of the 1970s saw the beginning of a
sea change in judicial attitudes toward sexual harassment. Between 1975 and
1979, when MacKinnon's book was published, several major feminist studies of
sexual harassment appeared. Although many lower courts, like those in Corne
and Tomkins, required plaintiffs to show that quid pro quo sexual harassment
formed part of an official employer policy in order to prevail under Title VII-a
standard that was virtually impossible to meet-appeals courts began increasingly to overrule the lower courts, using arguments similar to those made in the
feminist literature. In 1977, Corne and Tomkins were both reversed on appeal.142 In 1980, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the federal
agency charged with overseeing Title VII), perhaps influenced by this outpouring of feminist scholarship, changed its guidelines to clarify the appropriate
standard for Title VII employer liability. As of 1980, the EEOC declared:
[An employer] is responsible for its acts and those of its agents or supervisory
employees with respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether the specific acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the employer
and regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known of their
occurrence . . . [W]ith respect to conduct between fellow employees, an
employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where
the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have
known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action. 143
By the early 1980s, courts had begun to hold that hostile-environment
harassment also violated Title VII. 144 And in 1986, the Supreme Court finally

138. 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated and remanded, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
139. Franke, supra note 4, at 699 (quoting Come, 390 F. Supp. at 163).
140. 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.NJ. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 568 F.2d 1044 (3rd Cir. 1977).
141. !d. at 557.
142. See Krista J. Schoenheider, Comment, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace, 134 U. PA. L REv 1461, 1467 n.38 (1986).
143. 29 C.P.R.§ 1604.ll(c)-(d) (1980). In Part Ill, I discuss employer liability issues under a tort
regime.
144. See Schoenheider, supra note 142; see also Franke, supra note 4, at 701 n.29.
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weighed in with a unanimous decision. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 145
Justice Rehnquist said firmly that "without question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor
'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex." 146
As Franke has noted, Justice Rehnquist "treat[ed] the legal conclusion as
entirely self-evident" 147 and made no effort to justify or explain it. Justice
Rehnquist's blithe comment suggested that he saw Title VII as a statute that was
fundamentally gender-neutral-one that would protect men being harassed by
women as much as it would protect women harassed by men. To Justice
Rehnquist, Title VII was about formal equality-not about correcting a centuriesold pattern of discrimination against women. But in the celebratory mood that
prevailed in the wake of the Court's decision in Meritor, this undoubtedly
seemed a minor quibble. The feminists had, it seemed, won the battle, and, for
better or for worse, sexual harassment litigation and debate would center around
Title VII from then on.
Today-twenty years after MacKinnon concluded that tort law could not
provide an adequate remedy for sexual harassment and thirteen years after the
Court's landmark decision in Meritor-Title VII has created as many doctrinal
puzzles as it has solved. 148 As noted in the preceding sections, cases involving
same-sex sexual harassment have baffled the courts, leading to a wide variety of
approaches in different jurisdictions, 149 and cases in which men have allegedly
been harassed by women have also proven troublesome, in a political sense. 150
In an ironic twist, feminists focused their energies on Title VII precisely
because they saw it as the only way to raise public and judicial awareness of the
discriminatory context in which most workplace sexual harassment takes place.
To MacKinnon and many others, failing to understand that sexual harassment
was a problem, faced, above all, by women was to miss the most fundamental
point of all. Yet in the years that followed the initial feminist successes with
Title VII, the statute has been used, more and more often, to protect people
other than women sexually harassed by men. 151
On the level of purely formal equality, universal protection is, of course, fair
enough-Rehnquist's words in Meritor paved the way for such efforts, and few
would suggest that men who are harassed by men, or women harassed by
women, or men harassed by women, should have no remedy. But, from a
145. 477 u.s. 57 (1986).
146. !d. at 64.
147. Franke, supra note 4, at 704.
148. See discussion supra Part II.
149. Although Oncale added some clarity to the issue of same-sex harassment, its holding was
narrow and left several major issues unaddressed. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., I 18 S. Ct.
998 (1998); see also discussion supra note 26.
I 50. For a discussion of some of these cases, see Wid or, supra note I 2.
151. Between 1992 and 1998, for instance, the percentage of sexual harassment charges filed with
the EEOC by men went from 9.1% to 12.9%. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (visited
Feb. 25, 1999) <www.eeoc.gov/stats/harass.html>.
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feminist perspective, these cases may appear to dilute, even betray, Title VII's
promise. 152 Formal equality, as feminists know well, can be a Trojan horse.
Women who have been harassed by men are not the only "real" victims of
sexual harassment. Many of the cases involving male-to-male sexual harassment, for instance, involve facts that shock the conscience, and a man who is
sexually harassed by a woman may endure humiliation and fear that is both real
and worthy of sympathy. But if the purpose of Title VII was to protect
individuals who are also members of discrete and vulnerable groups from
abuses by those with more power, 153 these may not be the kinds of cases
feminists want brought under Title VII.
Let us revisit, for a moment, the distinction drawn earlier between the nature
of the harm of sexual harassment-a dignitary harm-and the context in which
the harm occurs--centuries of discrimination against women. All cases of
workplace sexual harassment damage the victim's dignitary interests regardless
of the victim's gender or the harasser's gender. However, not all cases of sexual
harassment plausibly can be seen as connected, in any proximate way, to
discrimination against women in the workplace. 154
D. A SECOND LOOK AT TORT REMEDIES FOR "CLASSIC" CASES
OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT

A tort approach to sexual harassment would seem to offer a route around
these conundrums. Nonetheless, of the hundreds of serious scholarly articles
about sexual harassment, only a handful attempt to examine the issue of
applying tort law to sexual harassment in the workplace. 155 MacKinnon's
I 52. See discussion of formal equality paradigm versus antisubordination paradigm, supra note 4I;
see also discussion of the legislative history of Title VII, supra note 42.
I53. Cf Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, I456 (N.D. Ill. 1988) ("The discrimination
Congress was concerned about when it enacted Title VII is one stemming from an imbalance of power
and an abuse of that imbalance by the powerful which results in discrimination against a discrete and
vulnerable group.").
I54. A look, again, at the analogy to violent sex crimes, is helpful. If a man is raped by another
man-{)r, indeed, if he is sexually assaulted by a woman-he has just as much claim on our sympathies
as a woman raped by a man. Beyond that, however, the similarities end. The sexual assault of women
by men undoubtedly occurs in a context of societal subordination and objectification of women, and it
makes a great deal of sense to argue that the sexual assault of women is, among other things, a form of
sex discrimination and gender subordination-but it would make very little sense to say the same of all
violent sex crimes against men. (To be precise-{)ne could say this, but the argument becomes tenuous).
I55. Interestingly, although a tort approach to sexual harassment has been given short shrift by
most serious scholars, practitioners have aggressively sought in recent years to use tort law to remedy
workplace sexual harassment. Indeed, until I991, when Congress amended Title VII to permit the
recovery of punitive damages, practitioners had a strong incentive to focus on possible tort remedies for
sexual harassment. For several practitioner-oriented discussions of tort remedies for sexual harassment,
see Christine Whitesell Lewis, The Ton of Outrage in Alabama: Emerging Trends in Sexual Harassment, 55 ALA. LAW. 33 (1994); Clay Mahaffey, Extreme and Outrageous Conduct: "Yarning Recognizes Workplace Sexual Misconduct as the Basis for an Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Claim, 33 LAND & WATER L. REv. 73I (1998); Peter G. Nash & Jonathan R. Mook, Employee Ton
Actions for Sexual Harassment in Virginia: Negotiating the Liability Mine Field, I GEO. MASON. U.
Civ. RTS. L.J. 247 (1990); Pamela J. White & Susan R. Matluck, Conduct Unbecoming a Lawyer:
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dismissal of.tort law was sharp and effective, and, perhaps unsurprising, few
scholars in the two decades since then have been willing to try to resuscitate a
tort approach to sexual harassment. 156 The authors of two student notes written
in the mid-1980s were the first to make the attempt, but though provocative and
well reasoned, the notes had little influence. 157 More recently, Ellen Paul and
Mark Hager have re-examined the idea of a tort approach to sexual harassment,
but they have done so from a perspective that is, in many ways, decidedly
antifeminist. 158
Hager and Paul both argue for the virtual evisceration of Title VII. They insist
that it is more or less impossible to view sexual harassment as a form of sex
discrimination and that, in general, employers should not be liable for workplace sexual harassment. They utterly reject the MacKinnonesque characterization of sexual harassment as a "group harm" and argue that such a
characterization merely leads to essentialism and "victimology." 159 Thus, Hager
says, "My point in a nutshell is that harassment should be met with tort suits
against actual perpetrators, not discrimination suits against employers ... 'hostile environments' [should] not be viewed as employment discrimination, without proof of employer policy." He states categorically that "(s]exual harassment
[should] be viewed as an offense to personal dignity and autonomy, not as a

Expanding Tort Remedies for Sexual Harassment, 24-SUM BRIEF 16 (1995); Bradley B. Wrightsel,
Kerans v. Porter Paint Co.: Ohio's New Tort of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace-the Beginning.
But Not the End, 18 Omo N. U. L. REv. 733 (1992).
156. Practitioners, less immersed in the scholarly literature, may have been less deterred by
MacKinnon's dismissal of a tort-approach than legal scholars were.
157. See Schoenheider, supra note 142; Mark D. Vhay, Comment, The Harms of Asking: Toward a
Comprehensive Treatment of Sexual Harassment, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 328 (1988). At this point, both of
these articles are rather dated, because both authors base much of their analysis of the flaws of Title VII
on aspects subsequently altered by Congress in 1991 (i.e., untill991, Title VII did not permit recovery
of punitive damages).
Schoenheider argues that existing tort categories are inadequate for addressing cases of sexual
harassment, and she proposes the creation of a new "tort of workplace harassment" which would make
actionable "unreasonable interference with the right to work in an atmosphere free of sex-based
discrimination." Her argument is fairly narrow, and solely concerned with "classic" cases of malefemale quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment. She does not expand her argument to
make use of existing tort categories, or to take on nonsexualized forms of harassment or address cases
of same-sex harassment. Like Schoenheider, Vhay is concerned about classic sexualized male-female
forms of harassment, but he grounds his argument more firmly in a conception of sexual harassment as
conduct that "violates standards of decency."
158. See Paul, supra note 23; Hager, supra note 23. Paul and Hager might dispute my characterization of their work as "antifeminist," but I think it is a fair one.
159. Note, however, that while Paul and Hager differ enormously in perspective from Schoenheider
and Vhay, they, too, take it for granted that it is "classic" forms of sexualized, male-female harassment
that deserve our attention and concern. Paul proposes a new tort of "sexual harassment/misconduct" as
a solution; she would require that harassing conduct be intentional and "outrageous" for a cause of
action to exist. Hager would similarly require that sexually harassing behavior be "extreme" rather than
merely "offensive" in order for it to be actionable; he proposes making use of a reconceptualized
version of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress or creating a new tort of harassment (or,
perhaps, using the Restatement catch-all, § 870).
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species of gender discrimination"; 160 the Title VII approach "encourages a
dependent ... and passive form of feminism." 161 Paul similarly argues that
courts have "unwittingly imported philosophical assumptions from a radical
agenda" into Title VII jurisprudence, which consequently promotes "victimology." 162 She argues that a tort approach to sexual harassment is better than a
Title VII approach because "it gets the federal courts out of what is essentially a
personal matter between individuals ... it places fault where fault truly lieswith the perpetrator." Better still, a tort approach forces women to "take
responsibility for their lives." 163
Turning to recent feminist scholarship, only Anita Bernstein has made a real
effort to apply tort concepts to sexual harassment jurisprudence. 164 Bernstein
argues that courts have relied excessively on a "reasonable person" standard (in
some jurisdictions, a "reasonable woman" standard) in evaluating claims of
hostile environment sexual harassment brought under Title Vll. 165 She suggests
replacing this reasonableness standard with what she terms a "respectful person" standard. Instead of asking whether the plaintiff "reasonably" felt that
certain behaviors created a hostile environment, courts would ask whether a
"respectful person" would have behaved in the ways alleged by the plaintiff.
Bernstein traces her concept of the "respectful person" to the deeply held
assumptions about dignity and personhood that pervade the common-law tradition, and she makes no bones about her "enthusiasm for torts." 166 But although
she favors importing a standard with a long tort law pedigree into Title VII
jurisprudence, she stops there. Bernstein does not make what would appear to
160. Hager, supra note 23, at 377.
161. /d. at 424.
162. Paul, supra note 23, at 364, 349.
163. /d. at 364-65. To those who accept that male sexual harassment of women often involves
discriminatory motives (or has an adverse impact amounting to discrimination), Hager and Paul's
hostility to Title VII does little to recommend them. But Hager and Paul point to some genuine
anomalies and flaws in Title VII jurisprudence-the same flaws that ·have troubled feminist scholars
like Franke, Abrams, and Schultz-and they also point out some potential advantages of a tort-based
approach that should appeal to feminists.
As they note, a tort-based approach that emphasizes the dignitary harm aspects of sexual harassment
would cut through the conundrums created by same-sex sexual harassment and by the hypothetical
equal opportunity harasser. They also argue for the importance of seeing sexual harassment as an
"individual" harm-although they overreach themselves here and acknowledge only grudgingly that
women may be sexually harassed by men with discriminatory motives. But even Hager and Paul's
obvious (if misplaced) disdain for what they see as the "victim thinking" inherent in the Title VII
discrimination paradigm is valuable, for it shows the degree to which that paradigm has generated an
unsympathetic backlash.
164. See Bernstein, supra note 23.
165. Currently, Bernstein notes, most courts ask whether a "reasonable" plaintiff would have
deemed the treatment complained of to be a hostile environment. She offers a feminist critique of the
concept of "reasonableness" as applied to sexual harassment, which she views as fundamentally a
tort-like dignitary wrong, an offense to dignity and personhood; notions of "reasonableness," she
argues, fail to understand that offended or humiliated states are "non-reasonable," in the sense that they
have to do fundamentally with the emotions. /d. at 453-87.
166. Anita Bernstein, An Old Jurisprudence: Respect in Retrospect, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1231 n.l3
(1998).
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be the obvious move: to argue that tort law could and should provide a
supplement and an alternative to Title VII.
The time is ripe to re-examine the possibility of using tort law to understand
and address cases of sexual harassment. If tort concepts can be successfully
used as a means of responding to workplace sexual harassment, tort law offers a
way out of the dilemmas of Title VII doctrine. 167 Cases of sexual harassment
that do not seem to be motivated by sex discrimination could be brought using
tort-based causes of action, while cases that are motivated by sex discrimination
could continue to be brought under Title VII, accompanied, when appropriate,
by supplemental tort claims.
This argument is most fundamentally one of principle, rather than pragmatics, and tort law, in its current state, may not offer a panacea for victims of
workplace harassment. But tort law does offer a set of concepts and terms, rules
and principles, that may help us break free from the Procrustean bed that Title
VII has become. Tort law permits us to conceive of workplace harassment ina
way that separates the dignitary nature of the harm from the discriminatory
context of the harm. A review of several recent cases suggests that some courts
are willing to be flexible in applying tort doctrine to situations of workplace
harassment. 168
1. Stockett v. Tolin
In Stockett v. Tolin, 169 the plaintiff alleged that her supervisor, Tolin, subjected her to repeated sexually harassing behavior, which included, "grabbing

167. No less a personage than Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has noted the relevance of tort
concepts to sexual harassment cases:
Writing separately in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, Justice O'Connor emphasized the value
of tort concepts--causation, deterrence, compensation, and "evil"-in the adjudication of
sex-discrimination actions brought under Title VII. In an earlier case, she wrote separately to
insist on a fault-like intent standard for employment discrimination claims brought under
Title VII. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 612 (1983) (O'Connor,
1., concurring). In a third case, United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992), in which the
majority characterized the plaintiff's sex-discrimination award as quasi-wages rather than
personal injury damages for purposes of federal income taxation, Justice O'Connor dissented
to insist that Title VII "offers a tort-like cause of action to those who suffer the injury of
employment discrimination." Justice O'Connor asserted: "Functionally, the law operates in
the traditional manner of torts: Courts award compensation for invasions of a right to be free
from certain injury in the workplace. Like damages in tort suits, moreover, monetary relief for
violations of Title VII serves a public purpose beyond offsetting specific losses."
Bernstein, supra note 23, at 496 n.390 (citations omitted).
168. I make no claim that the cases discussed in the following sections are either representative or
particularly influential; I offer them simply to demonstrate the ways in which tort law can, given
open-minded judges, provide a valuable tool for addressing workplace harassment. In addition to the
cases discussed in the text, see, for example, Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., I 12 F. 3d 1437, 1439 (lOth
Cir. 1997) (battery); Rudas v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 96-5987, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169, at
*12 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 1997) (assault and battery); Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580,585 (Ariz. 1987)
(intentional infliction of emotional distress).
169. 791 F. Supp. 1536 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
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her breasts and nipples, running his fingers up her shirt and grabbing her from
behind .... [Tolin] physically confined [Stockett] in her chair on at least two
occasions during which he fondled her breasts and pinned her up against the
wall with his body on at least one occasion." 170 Tolin also, on one occasion,
followed Stockett into the women's hathroom. 171
Stockett filed suit under Title VII, but she also asserted a range of state tort
claims, including battery, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and false imprisonment. The case was tried in federal court in the
Southern District of Florida. The parties waived the right to a jury trial, and the
court found in favor of Stockett on both the statutory and common-law claims:
Tolin's groping and kissing of Stockett constituted both an offensive and
unwelcome touching (i.e., battery) and an invasion of her physical solitude
(invasion of privacy). Tolin's battery of Plaintiff-the repeated and offensive
touching of the most private parts of Plaintiff's body-constitutes an intrusion
into her physical solitude. Similarly, the act of entering the ladies bathroom
constitutes an invasion of her privacy. In addition, the act of pinning Plaintiff
against tbe wall and refusing to allow her to escape, even though only done
for a short period of time, was false imprisonment. Further, the evidence
establishes repeated physical attacks, as well as repeated verbal licentiousness. Tolin's conduct toward Stockett can only be characterized as being
wanton, willful, and in total disregard of her rights. An ordinary prudent
person, viewing bis cumulative behavior, would be compelled to find this to
be outrageous. The sum total of Tolin's conduct therefore also constituted an
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 172

The court also declared that punitive damages could be assessed against the corporation Tolin worked for because Tolin was a managing partner and part-owner. 173
2. Godfrey v. Perkin-Elmer Corp.
In Godfrey v. Perkin-Elmer Corp./ 74 a New Hampshire court held that
allegations of sexually harassing behavior that included frequent suggestive
comments, demeaning language, insulting remarks made in front of coworkers,
staring, and "sitting and standing inordinately close, often in a sexually suggestive manner" could, if proved, be viewed as constituting both intentional
infliction of emotional distress and slander. 175 The court also noted that because
Godfrey's employer, Perkin-Elmer, allegedly had been informed of the harassment and made no attempt to investigate or remedy it, Perkin-Elmer would be
liable if a jury held in favor of the plaintiff.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

/d. at 1556.
See id. at 1542.
/d. at 1555-56.
See id. at 1560.
794F.Supp. 1179(D.N.H.1992).
!d. at 1183.
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In reaching this conclusion, the court declared that the conduct alleged by
Godfrey was "beyond the ordinary run of insult and offense which people are
expected to encounter.... " 176 The court approvingly quoted Prosser and Keeton
on Torts, noting that "[t]he extreme and outrageous nature of the conduct may
arise not so much from what is done as the abuse by the defendant of some
relation or position which gives the defendant actual or apparent power to
damage the plaintiff's interests." 177
The Godfrey court also held that the plaintiff had stated an actionable claim
for slander. According to the plaintiff, the defendant told her, in the presence of
several coworkers, "Your job isn't important and doesn't require brains." 178 On
another occasion, again in front of coworkers, he said, "You have a bad attitude.
You have a lot of growing up to do. You should learn what you're doing here.
Who do you think you're working for?" 179
Assessing these remarks, the court disputed the notion that defendant's
comments were mere "opinion." The standard, the court noted, is based upon
"the average person":
If that average ... hearer could reasonably understand a statement as action-

ably factual, then there is an issue for the jury's determination, precluding
dismissal or summary judgment. ... [T]he court is satisfied that such a remark
as "your job isn't important and doesn't require brains" is easily susceptible
of being verified as true or false and that an average hearer could thus
reasonably hear those words to defame the plaintiff. 180

In evaluating the second statement, the court observed that the statement had to
be viewed with the recognition that the plaintiff had "suffered through more
than a year of sexually-suggestive and demeaning comments and conduct, and
her requests to have such behavior cease had been ignored." 181 Given this
context, "such comments, from a superior at one's place of employment, after
over one year on the job, quite reasonably could be understood to imply the existence
of defamatory fact." 182 The defendant's statements "clearly imply plaintiff did not
know what she was doing, also a matter capable of verification." 183
3. Priest v. Rotary
In Priest v. Rotary, 184 Evelyn June Priest alleged that she was sexually
harassed by her employer, George Rotary, while working as a waitress at the
I76.
I77.
I78.
I79.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

!d. at II89.
!d. at II90 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
!d.
!d.
ld. at 1191 (citations omitted).
!d. at 1192.
!d.
!d.
634 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
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Fireside Coffee Shoppe. She filed suit under Title VII and also ·asserted several
tort causes of action: false imprisonment, assault and battery, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The trial court made the following findings of
fact:
During the first week of plaintiff's employment, while the plaintiff was in the
kitchen doing the dishes, defendant came up behind plaintiff Priest, put his
arms around her waist and placed his hands on her breasts and tried to kiss her
on the neck.... On another occasion, defendant came up behind plaintiff as
she was picking up a tray full of orders at the pick up station and placed his
hands on her waist and breast. ... On another occasion, Mr. Rotary came up
behind Ms. Priest while she was in the hallway next to the Fireside kitchen
and trapped her between himself and another male employee, pressing his
body against her and preventing her from being able to move away.... Ms.
Priest told Rotary on numerous occasions that his conduct was distressful and
upsetting to her.... Defendant Rotary exposed his genitals to plaintiff [and
another female coworker] as they were having a cup of coffee following the
end of Ms. Priest's shift. Defendant did so by quickly pulling down his pants
in such a way that [they] could see his genitals. 185

Applying the law to these facts, the trial court had no hesitation concluding
that Rotary's conduct inflicted on Priest "highly unpleasant mental reactions,
including fright, humiliation, shock, surprise, sickness, nervousness, apprehension, disgust, emotional pain, intimidation, anger, worry, substantial sleeplessness, nausea, and anxiety." 186 The Court was careful to state that Rotary's
actions were truly outrageous in the terms demanded by the Restatement:
Rotary's actions consisted of "more than mere insults, indignities, threats,
annoyances, and petty oppression .... [The Court finds that t]he conduct of
defendant Rotary was of an extreme and outrageous nature, such that his
conduct went beyond the bounds of decency, and no reasonable person could be
expected to endure it." 187 The court also found Rotary liable for "unlawful and
offensive touching," 188 constituting assault and battery and for false imprisonment because he "intentionally confined, restrained, and detained plaintiff ...
without her consent and without lawful privilege." 189
4. Kanzler v. Renner
In Kanzler v. Renner, 190 a 1997 case, the Wyoming Supreme Court showed a
similar willingness to interpret traditional tort categories broadly in order to
compensate a victim of workplace sexual harassment. As the court recounts it,
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

/d. at 574-75 (citations omitted).
/d. at 578.
/d. at 583.
/d. at 578.
/d. at 584.
937 P.2d 1337 (Wyo. 1997).
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plaintiff Kanzler, a police dispatcher, alleged that her coworker, Renner, engaged in harassing behavior: he repeatedly followed her home in a squad car,
and at work, he would come to her work space and "sit close to her and stare at
her for long periods of time while she was attempting to do her radio-dispatch
job." Renner also allegedly subjected Kanzler to repeated unwanted touchings:
for instance, he asked her when she would, "Teach him to two-step," and "later
that night ... Renner approached [Kanzler], grabbed her, pulled her body up to
his, and started to slow dance. She told him to leave her alone and pushed him
away." Finally, he "followed her into the [utility] closet and pulled the door
shut behind him. The light was not on. Renner grabbed Kanzler and pulled her
to him. She pushed away from him and the door flew open ... [he] pulled the
door shut. Kanzler states that she was very scared and angry and that she
attempted to call for help on a portable radio that was inside the closet. As she
reached for the radio, Renner tried to grab it away from her, and she managed to
escape from the closet." 191
Renner moved for summary judgment, arguing that his conduct did not
amount to "intentional infliction of emotional distress." The trial court agreed,
and Kanzler, the plaintiff, appealed. 192
In assessing Kanzler's case, the Wyoming Supreme court noted that Wyoming adopted the Restatement's definition of "outrageous conduct" and added
that previous Wyoming cases had "recognized that certain conduct in the
employment context may rise to the level of outrageousness necessary to
provide a basis for recovery for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress." 193 Thus, "our first task is to determine whether the pattern of behavior alleged, when it occurs in the workplace, satisfies the outrageousness
element of the tort." 194 The court is implicitly stating that the workplace is
different from other venues and that conduct that might not be "outrageous"
elsewhere may become so when committed in the workplace:
We are in accord with numerous jurisdictions which have determined that
inappropriate sexual conduct in the workplace can, upon sufficient evidence,
give rise to a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In reaching
this decision, we find persuasive this pronouncement from the Utah Supreme
Court: "It is worth stating forcefully that any other conclusion would amount
to an intolerable refusal to recognize that our society has ceased seeing sexual
harassment in the workplace as a playful inevitability that should be taken in
good spirits and has awakened to the fact that sexual harassment has a
corrosive effect on those who engage in it as well as those who are subjected
to it and that such harassment has far more to do with the abusive exercise of
one person's power over another than it does with sex." 195
I91.
I92.
I93.
I94.
I95.

/d. at I339-40.

!d.
/d. at I341 (emphasis added).
/d.
/d. at I341-42 (citations omitted).
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The Kanzler court noted that despite general agreement that workplace sexual
harassment might constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress, different
decisions "reveal widely varying and inconsistent attitudes regarding the severity of the sexual misconduct required for a showing of outrageousness ... this
disparity is due in large part to the vague, subjective and value-laden concept of
'outrageousness.' " 196 Nonetheless, the Kanzler court found "several recurring
factors that courts have used to assist in the determination of whether particular
conduct in the workplace is sufficiently outrageous to survive a preliminary
motion." 197 These factors included: (1) "[a]buse of power," defined as "an
abuse by the actor of a position, or a relation with the other, which gives him
actual or apparent authority over the other, or power to affect his interests"; 198
(2) "[r]epeated incidents/pattern of harassment"; (3) "[u]nwelcome touching/
offensive, non-negligible physical conduct"; and (4) "[r]etaliation for refusing
or reporting sexually-motivated advances." 199
Looking at these factors, the Kanzler court had little difficulty concluding that
Renner's alleged acts might indeed be considered tortiously "outrageous":
"Kanzler has alleged conditions and circumstances which are beyond mere
insults, indignities, and petty oppression and which, if proved, could be construed as outrageous." 200
These four cases are not atypical; other cases, too, demonstrate the willingness of some courts to permit plaintiffs to assert common-law causes of action
for workplace sexual 1Iarassment. 201 Of course, not all courts have been so
flexible-many cases reaching contrary holdings could also be cited, and in
many jurisdictions, this is still a contested issue. Again, tort law offers no
panacea. Nonetheless, on a pragmatic level, tort law may offer a promising
avenue for some plaintiffs. More importantly, on the level of principle, tort law
offers a way to fundamentally reconceptualize one's understanding of workplace
harassment. The flexibility of the courts in Stockett, Godfrey, Priest, and Kanzler
suggests a way to move beyond "classic" cases of male-female sexual harassment
and toward a broader understanding of the ways in which all abusive treatment in the
workplace inflicts dignitary harms on the workers who are victimized.
E. TORT REMEDIES FOR WORKPLACE HARASSMENT, BROADLY CONCEIVED: THE
WORKPLACE AS AN INHERENTLY AGGRAVATING FACTOR IN DIGNITARY HARMS

The tort conception of dignitary harm does not privilege sexual harms over
nonsexual harms. This suggests the possibility of using tort law as a means of
addressing workplace abusiveness of the sort described in the hypothetical in
196. !d. at I342.
197. !d. at I343.
I98. !d. (citing Bryant v. Better Bus. Bureau of Greater Maryland., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 720, 747 (D.
Md. 1996)).
I99. !d. at 1343.
200. /d.
20 I. See cases listed supra note 168.
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Part Ill.s.2-abusiveness that would not give rise to a cause of action under
Title VII as it does not involve discrimination on the basis of race, sex, color,
religion, or national origin. Such abusiveness may be every bit as commonand as painful to the victim-as discriminatory harassment, and tort law provides a promising way for plaintiffs to obtain relief. Indeed, tort concepts
suggest that the workplace could and should be deemed an inherently aggravating factor when courts assess plaintiff claims of dignitary harm.
As the Kanzler court pointed out, in many of the sexual harassment cases
involving claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, courts have
looked to the issue of abuse of power to determine whether a defendant's
conduct is truly "outrageous," as required by the Restatement. Most courts
adopting this approach have construed "abuse of power" quite broadly. The
Kanzler court, for instance, regarded abuse of power as "an abuse by the actor
of a position, or a relation with the other, which gives him actual or apparent
authority over the other, or power to affect his interests" and approvingly
quoted the Utah Supreme Court, which stated in Rutherford v. AT&'f2°2 that, in
general, workplace sexual harassment "has far more to do with the abusive
exercise of one person's power over another than it does with sex." 203 Similarly, in Godfrey, the Court affirmed Prosser and Keeton's assertion that "[t]he
extreme and outrageous nature of the conduct may arise not so much from what
is done as from the abuse by the defendant of some relation or position which
gives the defendant actual or apparent power to damage the plaintiff's interests. " 204
This flexible notion of "abuse of power" suggests that dignitary harms
inflicted in the workplace could be seen as inherently aggravated by the very
fact that they occur in the workplace, 205 a setting in which employees are
clearly in a dependent relationship both vis-a-vis their supervisors (most obviously) and vis-a-vis their coworkers (less obviously, but equally powerfully).
Take, first, the easier proposition that harassment by a supervisor will always
constitute an abuse of power. This argument is straightforward: supervisors, by
definition, have more power than those they supervise; they can often hire and
fire; they may be in a position to make reports on an employee that will affect
her advancement; they may be able to alter the terms or conditions of an
employee's work (by assigning more, less, or different work, for instance); and

202. 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992).
203. Kanzler, 937 P.2d at 1342 (quoting Rutherford v. AT&T Comm. of Mountain States, Inc., 844
P.2d 949, 978 (Utah 1992)).
204. Godfrey v. Perkin-Elmer, 794 F. Supp. I 179, I 190 (D.N.H. 1992).
205. Cf Dennis P. Duffy, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Employment at Will: The
Case Against "Tortification" of Labor and Employment Law, 74 B.U. L. REv. 387, 397 (1994)
("[C]omment e to the Restatement states that outrageous conduct 'may arise from an abuse by the actor
of a position, or relation with the other, which gives him actual or apparent authority over the other, or
power to affect his interests.' Some courts have seized upon this comment as a basis for applying the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in the employment context, reasoning that the
imbalance in bargaining power between employer and employee requires application of the tort.").
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they will generally have greater access to people still higher in the employment
hierarchy. If a supervisor behaves inappropriately or abusively to a subordinateeven if the offending behavior is fairly minqr-the subordinate is placed in a
difficult or impossible position: failure to quietly tolerate the supervisor's
abusive behavior may mean anything from having to endure a workplace that is
increasingly unpleasant (harder tasks, longer hours, or reduced possibility of
advancement) to the actual loss of the subordinate's job. The subordinate is in a
lose-lose ·situation if harassed by a supervisor: she can either accept the harassing behavior, which renders the workplace unpleasant (at the least), or she can
protest and risk making the workplace even more unpleasant, if she does not
lose her job.
While it is true that coworkers, in general, do not have the power to promote
or fire one another, coworker harassment may still be distressing and even
discriminatory. A worker who relies on his job for economic survival is effectively a captive audience for a harassing coworker.Z06 Coworkers have significant ability to alter the "terms or conditions" of employment by behaving in
ways that render the workplace intolerable. Using the Kanzler or the Prosser
and Keeton definition, abuse of power may also exist where one person's
relation with another gives him the actual or apparent ability to affect or damage
the other person's interests. By harassing a coworker in a way that renders the
workplace intolerable for the victim, coworkers can clearly damage the victim's
interests.
ln Priest, the court also found that "defendant Rotary abused his position in
relationship to Priest. ... " 207 In assessing Priest's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the court also found that Priest was "peculiarly susceptible
to emotional distress .... " 208 The court held this to be so both because of an
"abdominal condition" that troubled Priest and, significantly, "by reason of her
economic condition": 209 her job was "the sole source of financial support for
her minor son" and she had "bought a car and furniture and rented an apartment
in reliance on the fact of being employed at Fireside." 210
This, the court noted, rendered Rotary's conduct toward Priest particularly
outrageous because of his "knowledge that plaintiff Priest was peculiarly
susceptible to emotional distress by reason of her abdominal condition and by
reason of her economic condition. " 2 u To the Priest court, the fact that the
defendant's abusive behavior occurred in the workplace is seen as an aggravating condition; realistically, Priest couldn't simply quit her job when Rotary

206. Cf Jack Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments (1999) <http://www.yale.edu!lawweb/
jbalkin/articles/frsphoen.htm> (arguing that "workplace harassment is not protected by the First
Amendment because it is directed at a captive audience").
207. Priest v. Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571,578 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
208. /d.
209. !d.
210. /d. at 577.
211. /d. at 583 (emphasis added).
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began to harass her because she needed that job. Rotary knew this and took
advantage of her dependence.
Implicit in the Priest court's analysis is a deep critique of the employment-atwill paradigm: 212 the court suggests that an employment relationship creates a
special duty of care for employers, given the financial dependence of their
employees. Employer-defendants should be presumed to realize that employees
are economically dependent on them and that if employees are faced with an
abusive workplace, their emotional distress will inevitably be extreme. 213
This reasoning bears a striking resemblance to the reasoning in earlier lines
of tort cases, which held common carriers, innkeepers, and public utilities to a
stricter standard in assessing intentional infliction of emotional distress. Further,
this reasoning suggests that a fundamental shift in thinking about dignitary
harms inflicted in the workplace is due.
The elements of power, choice, and dependence necessarily affect views of
dignitary harms. As many courts have noted, not everything that is hurtful or
annoying gives rise to a cause of action; absent a special duty of care, every
person has to put up with a certain amount of indignity. 214 In particular, with
regard to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, "mere insult,
indignity, or annoyance" is not enough to give rise to tort liability, absent "other
circumstances of aggravation." 215 Nonetheless, since the Nineteenth Century,
many courts have been willing to hold common carriers and their agents to a
higher standard of behavior. 216 The reasoning behind these cases is clear: when
using trains, planes, or buses, and the like, travelers are, in effect, captives: the
conditions of modem life make it virtually impossible for us to "opt out" of
using common carriers. In order to participate fully and equally in social,
political, or economic life, people must use common carriers, creating deep
dependence. This dependence renders people particularly vulnerable to any
dignitary harms inflicted by common carriers. For public policy reasons, many
courts have held that this dependence gives rise to the higher standard of care

212. For a case typifying the employment at wiJI approach, see, for example, Pearson v. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., 332 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. !964). For a discussion and defense of the concept of
employment at will, see Duffy, supra note 205, at 396.
213. Several courts have accepted this analysis. See Austin, supra note 121, at 14. ("In granting
relief to employees [on claims on intentional infliction of emotional distressl, the courts sometimes
make reference to the weaker bargaining power of employees as a group, the special nature of the
employment relationship, and the limitations on the free mobility of labor."). Austin cites, for instance,
Blong v. Snyder, 361 N.W.2d 312, 316 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984) ("Plaintiff's status as an employee entitled
him to more protection from insultive or abusive treatment than would be expected in interactions
between two strangers.").
214. See, e.g., PRossER, supra note 79, at 59.
215. /d. This "severe harm requirement presents formidable obstacles to recovery." Austin, supra
note 121, at 16.
216. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Chandler, 3 Mason 242 (C.C.D. Mass 1823); Bleeker v. Colorado &
S. R.R. Co., 114 P. 481 (Colo. 1911); Cole v. Atlanta & W. Point R.R. Co., 31 S.E. !07 (Ga. 1897);
Knoxville Traction Co. v. Lane, 53 S.W. 557 (Tenn. 1899); Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Jones, 39 S.W. 124
(Tex. Civ. App. 1897) (error refused).
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expected of common carriers and their agents: the burden to common carriers of
being held to a somewhat higher behavior standard is, on balance, less than the
harm inflicted on ordinary citizens subjected to abusive behavior by common
carriers.
Common carriers are held to a higher standard of care in most areas of tort
law, most clearly in the jurisprudence of intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 1n more recent years, some courts have extended this reasoning to
cover inns and public utilities, as well as common carriers, for the same
reasons. 217
In the many cases assessing whether or not common carriers and the like
should be held to a higher standard of care, courts have enunciated a three-part
test: First, is the provided service something that is essential for ordinary people
to realize their full potential a_s citizens and persons? Second, how burdensome
would it be for an ordinary person to find an alternative source of the provided
service? Third, which would be more burdensome: holding the provider to a
higher standard of care or expecting ordinary people to bear the costs of the
provider's tortious behavior?
Applying this three-part test to the context of the workplace, it makes sense
to conclude that the employment context should be considered an inherently
aggravating factor when courts assess whether the infliction of dignitary harm
rises to the level of seriousness necessary for liability? 18
(1) Is the provided service something that is essential for ordinary people to
reach their full potential as citizens and persons?
This question is easily answered in the affirmative. The days when many
Americans could grow and produce most of what they needed are long past. For
most, employment is necessary for simple survival. Some people do inherit
wealth, but such examples are relatively rare. Further, in a nation with an
increasingly tattered social safety net, no one can assume that the state will care
for them if they do not work? 19 As a result, over the course of the past century,
employment has become increasingly essential. Today, a higher percentage of
Americans than ever before must participate in the workforce to survive, and a
smaller percentage of Americans than ever before is employed on farms or in
small businesses.
Some statistics paint a striking picture: in 1900, only fifty percent of Americans of working age participated in the labor force, and thirty-eight percent of
217. See, e.g., Birmingham Ry. Light & Power Co. v. Glenn, 60 So. Ill (Ala. 1912); Haile v. New
Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 65 So. 225 (La. 1914) (plaintiff recovered after agent of common carrier
referred to her as "a big fat woman"); Boyce v. Greeley Sq. Hotel Co., 126 N.E. 647 (N.Y. 1920);
Gillespie v. Brooklyn Heights R.R. Co., 70 N.E. 857 (N.Y. 1904) (plaintiff called a "deadbeat" and a
"swindler"); St. Louis-San Francisco R. R. Co. v. Clark, 229 P. 779 (Okla. 1924); Buchanan v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 106 S.E. 159 (S.C. 1920) (indecent proposal made by telegraph messenger); Lipman v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 93 S.E. 714 (S.C. 1917) (plaintiff called a "lunatic"); Milner Hotels v.
Dougherty, 15 So. 2d 358 (Miss. 1943).
218. Cf Balkin, supra note 206.
219. What's more, being on welfare or other forms of public assistance is severely stigmatized.
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those people were employed on farms. In 1940, the percentage of Americans
working had increased only to fifty-two percent, but only seventeen percent of
those people worked on farms. In 1990, sixty-five percent of working age
Americans were employed-and fewer than two percent worked on farms. ln
1997, the percentage of Americans participating in the labor force had risen to
seventy-two percent. 220
Furthermore, the people who comprise the workforce have changed. In 1900,
fewer than twenty percent of working-age women were employed. In 1967,
fifty-one percent of women were employed; in 1997, sixty percent of workingage women were employed and a whopping seventy-two percent of mothers of
minor children worked. 221
For most Americans, then, work is necessary for economic survival, and it is
no accident that Americans are working longer hours and more weeks of the
year than ever before; the real wage has fallen in the last decade and is lagging
further and further behind the consumer price index. 222 The same things cost
more, and with falling real wages, this means that work-and plenty of it-is
increasingly necessary for most Americans.Z 23
Moreover, work has become an increasingly central part of how social
identities are constructed. 224 At one time, religion, class, and birthplace were the
primary factors affecting identity. But increasingly, work is a primary identifier.
As Vicki Schultz notes, "In advanced industrial societies, wage work is a
primary source of ... psychological well-being: [a] job provides both the means
to meet life's concrete needs and a position that confers a sense of place in the
world. As scholars have begun to recognize, work not only bestows a livelihood
and sense of community, but also provides the basis for full citizenship, and
even for personal identity. Like it or not, we are what we do." 225
220. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Characteristics of Families Summary (visited
Feb. 25, 1999) <http://stats.bls.gov/news.release/work.nws.htm>. According to the Bureau of Labor
Statistics' Work Experience Summary for 1997, "[t]he long-term rise in work activity of the population
is entirely attributable to the increasing likelihood of women working outside the home."
22I. See id.
222. See Charles J. Whalen, The Age of Anxiety: Erosion of the American Dream, USA TODAY
MAG., Sept. I, 1996, at 14. ("After adjusting for inflation, today's hourly wages give the average
American less purchasing power than the average U.S. worker had in 1965. Although families have
responded by sending more members to work and having them work longer hours, real median family
income has fallen more than five percent since 1989."); see also David R. Francis, U.S. Workers on Job
Longer for Less Pay, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 15, 1992, at 8.
223. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 603,
626 (1943) ("We do not have slave labor, but there are nevertheless compulsions which force people to
work .... "). Of course, it could be argued that the information age will alter all this: more and more of
us will be able to control our work lives to a greater and greater extent; computers will replace people
and usher in an age of leisure, and so on. If this happens, and employment become less relevant for
most Americans, the workplace may no longer need to be viewed as an aggravating factor in assessing
dignitary tort claims. Until then, however, I believe it should be deemed to be an aggravating factor for
the reasons stated herein.
224. Cf Abrams, supra note 4, at 1172 n.l51 (commenting on the identity-affirming aspects of
work).
225. Schultz, supra note 4, at 1756; cf STUDS TERKEL, WORKING xiii (Ballantine 1985) (1972)
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The notion that work is critical in forming s<;>cial identities and in constituting
people as citizens can be seen with particular clarity in the context of the debate
about America's welfare system. 226 To be without a job, in the current American
social climate, is to be severely stigmatized, thought of as lazy, dependent,
entitled, child-like.Z27 Many commentators-especially conservative and neoliberal commentators like Mickey Kaus, 228 David Ellwood/29 and Lawrence
Mead 230-have insisted that "work for the employable is the clearest social
obligation" 231 and that "employment is essential to being a functioning citizen."232 In this vision, the rights that inhere in all citizens are-quite literallycontingent upon a person's status as a member of the labor force.Z 33
Work, then, is critical both for simple survival and for the formation of social
and civic identity. Even more than in the case of common carriers and public
accommodations, then, Americans rely on employment to secure the full benefits of citizenship and social and economic life.
(2) How burdensome would it be for an ordinary person to find an alternative
source of the provided service?
In order to decide that employers should be held to a higher standard of care
vis-a-vis their workers, it must be shown that for most workers, finding alternative sources of income is extremely burdensome.Z34 In 1995, finding a job took
("[Work] is about a search, too, for daily meaning as well as daily bread, for recognition as well as
cash, for astonishment raiher than torpor; in short, for a sort of life raiher Ihan a Monday through Friday
sort of dying."); HERBERT lirLL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 34 (1977) (describing work as "Ihe most significant source of identity for western men and women"); REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 252 (N.Y. TiMES ed., 1968) (" 'The principal
measure of progress toward equality [is] Ihat of employment. It is Ihe primary source of individual or
group identity. In America, what you do is what you are: to do nothing is to be nothing; to do little is to
be little.' "(quoting Daniel Patrick Moynihan)).
226. For an interesting discussion of Ihis issue, see James W. Fox, Jr., Liberalism, Democratic
Citizenship, and Welfare Reform: The Troubling Case of Workfare, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 103 (1996).
227. See, e.g., JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 22 (1991)
("To be on welfare is to lose one's independence and to be treated as less Ihan a full member of society.
In effect, ihe people who belong to the underclass are not quite citizens.").
228. See generally MICKEY KAus, THE END OF EQUALITY (1992).
229. See generally DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT POVERTY IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY (1998).
230. See generally LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT (1986).
231. /d. at 243.
232. LAWRENCE M. MEAD, THE NEW POLffiCS OF POVERTY: THE NONWORKING POOR IN AMERICA 13
(1992).
233. Two obvious ironies strike me: first, as usual in Ihis sort of conservative discourse, only the
poor who benefit from "unearned" wealih (in Ihe form of welfare payments) are ihought of as losing
Iheir right to be considered full citizens. Although it is work ilself (raiher than simply Ihe possession of
money) Ihat is Ihought of as constituting persons as full citizens, Ihere is no suggestion ihat Ihe
nonworking wealthy are not entitled to full citizenship. Second, it's worth noting that the same
conservative commentators who insist Ihat work is boih a right and an obligation of citizenship, in the
context of welfare reform, tend to insist upon the validity of "employment at will" conceptions of
employer-employee relationships when it comes to labor relations and the like. In other words, work is
a right if we're talking about welfare-but not if we're discussing employment practices in any oiher
context.
234. It is worth noting also Ihat workplace abusiveness does sometimes force employees out of
their jobs: a recent study by a University of North Carolina psychologist found Ihat 12% of
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the average American job-searcher nearly three months, and, according to the
Census Bureau, workers who lost their jobs generally were unable to find new
jobs that paid as well as their old jobs: on average, workers who had previously
lost their jobs found themselves with wages that were more than twenty percent
lower in their new jobs.Z 35 Like passengers on a bus or people in their homes,
workers are essentially a captive audience in their jobs: leaving is technically
possible, but not without significant costs.Z36 Moreover, to the extent that
employers and their agents are not held to a higher standard of care, a worker
may leave one abusive place of employment in which he has no legal recourse,
only to find other equally abusive workplaces. Where this happens, the worker's
"choice" of workplaces is illusive. 237
(3) Which would be more burdensome: holding the provider to a higher
standard of care or expecting ordinary people to bear the costs of the provider's
tortious behavior?
Employers are already expected to take reasonable steps to ensure that
workplaces will be physically safe for their employees, providing workers with
adequate protection from toxic chemicals, dangerous machinery, smoking co-

the workplace harassment victims she surveyed quit their jobs in order to be free of harassment. See
Martha Waggoner, Workplace Incivility Rising, ASSOCIATED PREss, May 29, 1998. Job loss-for
whatever reason--can have a devastating psychological effect on a worker as well as a devastating
financial effect. A recent study found that the impact of job loss on most workers is clinically
indistinguishable from the loss of a spouse. See James Krohe, Jr., An Epidemic of Depression?, 3 I
AcRoss THE BoARD 8 (1994). The notion that sexual harassment, in particular, can cause real and
lasting psychological and physical harm can no longer be seriously disputed. See Bernstein, supra note
23, at 461 nn.96-97 (citing studies on the psychological and physical impact of workplace sexual
harassment on women).
235. See Whalen, supra note 222, at 14. Whalen also cites a I994 Department of Labor study,
which found that "less than one of three displaced workers returns to full-time employment with equal
or higher pay.·~ /d. at 14; see also Esther Sales, Surviving Unemployment: Economic Resources and Job
Loss Duration in Blue Collar Households, 40 Soc. WORK 4, 483 (1995).
236. See Balkin, supra note 206, at 'li 34 ("Economic coercion leaves many workers to avoid
exposure to harassing speech. Employees are a much better example of a captive audience than the
so-called paradigm case of people sitting in their homes.").
237. But see Duffy, supra note 205, at 413 (claiming that "[w]ith the possible exception of cases in
which managers are alleged to have taken action tantamount to false imprisonment, employees subject
to outrageous actions are always free to avoid emotional distress caused by their supervisors by
terminating employment"). As Balkin notes, however, captive audience doctrine provides a different
way of analysing such assetions: "Captivity ... is a matter of practicality rather than necessity. It is
about the right not to have to flee rather than the inability to flee ... minimum wage workers may have
to move from job to job to avoid harassment. But the question is not whether there is another equally
low-paying job available. The question is whether they should have to leave a job in order to avoid
being sexually harassed." Balkin, supra note 206, at 'li 34. For another thought-provoking discussion
that implicitly challenges some of the core assumptions of the employment at will paradigm, see
Ackerman, supra note IOO. The employment at will paradigm assumes that workers enjoy complete
freedom of contract; if they accept (or remain in) jobs in which they are harassed, they can be deemed
to have consented to such an arrangement as Offy's remarks imply. But, as Ackerman notes, there is "a
very powerful argument in favor of banning dignity-stripping arrangements, even those reached by
knowledgeable adults in uncoerced settings." Ackerman, supra note I 00. In other words, even if
Duffy's assumptions are valid (wbich, I argue, they are not), one can take the position that certain
things-including one's dignity-simply cannot be contracted away.

52

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 88:1

workers, and so on. Employers are also expected to take reasonable steps to
protect their employees from being discriminated against on the job, inform
them of antidiscrimination laws and policies, and act promptly to remedy any
discrimination that occurs. Requiring employers to bear the burden of ensuring
a nonabusive workplace, one in which all workers (regardless of sex) would be
assured a workplace free of intentionally inflicted dignitary harms, is a logical
extension of this premise.
In practice, there is no reason for such a requirement to be particularly
onerous to employers.Z 38 Employers would be required to create "antiabusiveness" policies: inform all employees that they are expected to treat
others with courtesy and respect and refrain from threatening, intimidating,
humiliating, and harassing subordinates or coworkers.Z 39 ·This concept is not
particularly hard to articulate; a few well-chosen examples would generally
suffice to establish the kinds of behavior that are unacceptable in the context of
the workplace. 240 If an employee complained that a supervisor or coworker was
behaving abusively, the employer would have a duty to investigate and remedy
the abuse (if the abuse was found to be serious) by disciplining or transferring
the abusive person. If an employee sued the tortfeasor and the employer,
juries would be instructed to take into account the employer's policy about
abusive behavior, and the response of the employer to allegations of abuse, in
assessing employer liability.Z41 In this context, using tort law to address the
problem of workplace harassment and abuse offers a promising practical solution.

238. In fact, such a requirement would probably benefit employers' bottom line, because employers
have every reason to believe that workers who are harassed are demoralized and less productive: a
recent University of North Carolina study on workplace incivility and bullying found that 12% of
victims of workplace bullying said they intentionally decreased the quality of their work as a result of
bullying; 22% said they decreased their work effort; 28% lost work time trying to avoid their
persecutor, 52% said they lost time worrying about the persecutor and their interactions; 46%
considered changing jobs, and 12% actually did change jobs. See Waggonner, supra note 234; see also
Christine Pearson, Workplace "Incivility" Study, Survey Research Summary (visited June I, 1999)
<www.bullybusters.org/home/fwdlbb/res/pearson.html> .
239. Cf Bernstein, supra note 23, at 495 (discussing what a "respectful workplace" might look
like). It should be noted that in addition to relying on existing tort categories to address workplace
abusiveness, there are three other possibilities worth exploring: (1) judges could recognize an independent tort of workplace harassment, derived from the existing dignitary harm torts but with a more
precise and focused definition; (2) states could adopt workplace harassment statutes, which could
similarly contain carefully crafted definitions designed to permit changes in norms but to prevent
frivolous claims; and (3) a federal workplace harassment statute could be developed. The statutory
approach is worth serious consideration, as it would also eliminate many of the other practical
difficulties and uncertainties associated with a tort-based approach to workplace abusiveness. See
discussion of potential objection to the tort approach, infra Part IV. Exploring this further, however, is
beyond the scope of this article.
240. In fact, consulting companies exist that promise to help employers design "antibullying"
programs for their workplaces. See Guynn, supra note 122, at D I; see also The WorkDoctor,
Information Services for Workplace Health <http://www.workdoctor.com> (the website of the major
workplace bullying consulting group).
241. Part IV.c, infra, addresses and refutes some potential objections to this approach.
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POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS TO THE TORT APPROACH

So far, this article has outlined the many ways in which Title VII jurisprudence provides an inadequate account of the wrongs of workplace sexual
harassment and argues for a more pluralistic conception of workplace harassment: one that acknowledges that all people can suffer from severe dignitary
harms inflicted in the workplace, regardless of their gender and regardless of
whether they were subjected to dignitary harms that were sexual in nature.
Common-law torts, applied creatively, might offer such a way to address most
kinds of workplace harassment, and, because of the changed social meaning of
work, the employment context should be considered an aggravating factor when
courts assess workplace dignitary harms.
The primary objections to this approach are all, in one way or another,
pragmatic objections. They will be discussed here only briefly, because none of
the objections reaches this article's fundamental point, which is that the common law offers us a way to distinguish between the dignitary nature of the harm
of workplace harassment and the discriminatory context in which much harassment occurs. This distinction is important, because it permits the articulation of
a philosophical point that is brought out too rarely, namely that the workplace
harassment of women is wrong not for some essentialist reason having to do
with "women" qua women, but because the workplace harassment of any
human being, male or female, is wrong. Furthermore, tort jurisprudence provides a way to articulate the intuition that harms in the workplace should be
taken more seriously than harms in many other places.
A. THE "GROUP HARM" OBJECTION

Catharine MacKinnon specifically rejected the notion of using the common
law to remedy workplace sexual harassment of women. As discussed in Part
III.c of this article, she felt that tort law, with its emphasis on individual rights
and harms, was inherently ill-suited to addressing a problem that was faced by
women because they were women and that affected the ability of all women to
advance in the workplace. Following MacKinnon, many other feminist legal
writers have likewise insisted that sexual harassment needs to be understood as
a group harm, not an individual harm, 242 and that common-law remedies are
therefore inappropriate. Thus, Kathryn Abrams argues:
Yes, harassment is a dignitary injury, but if we fail to appreciate that this
dignitary injury is a function of, and connected to, other injuries within an
unequal and hierarchical relationship, we miss much of what is morally and
politically significant about the wrong .... [F]ailing to highlight the fact that
this humiliation [sexual harassment] arises from a context of systematic

242. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 4, at 1176 (arguing that although sexual harassment may be "a
dignitary harm," this is "a feature ... that captures only part of the wrong ... sexual harassment is also
understood as a barrier to women's professional progress").
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gender inequality individualizes the wrong and diminishes the imperative for
responding to it. ... This is not simply an abstract point but an issue with
ramifications for public education, legal enforcement, and private efforts at
prevention. 243
The feminist insistence that sexual harassment must be understood as a
systematic barrier to women's equal access to economic, social, and political
power is an understandable stance. Indeed, in the early days of the women's
movement, the feminist emphasis on sexual harassment as a "group harm" may
well have played an important role in raising public awareness and sparking
debate and reform. Today, however, an inability to transcend the distinction
between "group" and "individual" harms does a disservice to understanding
sexual harassment. The distinction has become increasingly facile: it fosters an
essentialist understanding of workplace relations between the sexes and fails to
convey many of the complex truths about the ways in which workplace harassment harms all workers.
Furthermore, on a purely pragmatic level, the "group harm" objection to
pursuing tort-based remedies has little force for two reasons. First, Title VII
claims can be raised in conjunction with tort causes of action; the victims can
have it both ways. Part III argued for the need to disaggregate the nature of the
harm of sexual harassment from the context in which the harm occurs. Tort
causes of action, generally speaking, address the dignitary nature of the harm of
sexual harassment of individual working women. Title Vll actions, in contrast,
address the discriminatory context in which harassment of working women
occurs. lf a plaintiff feels that the harassment she suffered was discriminatory,
she can raise a Title VII claim and assert causes of action in tort as wellsomething that many plaintiffs do already?44
Second, even within the "individualistic" confines of tort law, women should
be able to bring up arguments about the context of discrimination against
women. Indeed, as the cases reviewed in Part lll.o demonstrate, some courts
have been quite willing to see the discriminatory context in which many women
work as an exacerbating factor when assessing the severity of workplace
harassment of women. The discriminatory context in which harassment of
women occurs is clearly relevant to the "outrageousness" of the harm, to the
243. /d. at 1186-87. But cf Bernstein, supra note 166, at 1243-44 (arguing that the "group" nature
of the harm of sexual harassment is an issue that is (to some degree, at least) beyond the scope of the
courts: "The war against sexual harassment ... has many fronts and needs an array of weapons. I
would wage the war in segments, moving group-related concerns to the theaters of legislatures,
workplaces, unions, and public opinion, while saving courts for the functions they best serve").
244. My colleague Judith Resnik points out that raising simultaneous tort and Title VII claims
requires plaintiffs to pursue their claims in federal court, something that women harassment victims
might at times prefer to avoid because a greater percentage of state court judges are ·women and
arguably would be more sympathetic to novel interpretations of tort law regarding sexual harassment.
This is an intriguing point requiring empirical research; it also raises the possibility that a state statutory
approach to workplace harassment, discussed infra note 239, might be well worth exploring, although
doing so is beyond the limited scope of this article.
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culpability of the defendant, and to the employer's responsibility for seeking to
prevent and remedy such abusive behavior.
B. THE "RIGID COURTS" OBJECTION

MacKinnon and other feminist writers make another objection to seeking tort
remedies for workplace harassment. They note that many courts have been
inflexible in applying tort doctrine to situations of workplace sexual harassment.
For all the cases in which judges have been willing to view workplace harassment as "outrageous," there are many other cases in which courts have insisted
that repeated sexual come-ons, insults, offensive touchings, and the like, however annoying or offensive, do not rise to the level of outrageousness required
for recovery.Z45 Although feminist thinkers have given less attention to this
issue, 246 it might also be objected that if courts have been unwilling to be
flexible when it comes to granting recovery for sexual harassment of women, a
problem that has received enormous amounts of attention, they will be even
more rigid when it comes to assessing whether nonsexual forms of dignitary
harms in the workplace should be actionable. 247
This objection also lacks force, because it ignores the doctrinal benefits of
adopting tort doctrine in this context. The preferred approach is based on
principle, rather than pragmatics. On the level of principle, the potential reluctance of courts to flexibly apply tort concepts when faced with allegations of
workplace harassment does not alter the fundamental point about the ways in
which common-law tort concepts permit us to reconceptualize .workplace harassment.
Even on the level of pragmatics, however, the potential rigidity of the courts
does not defeat the benefits of a tort-based approach. The genius of the common
law is that it changes over time, adapting to reflect changing technologies,
structures, and social mores. In the past two decades, more and more courts,
faced with tort-based claims, have been willing to take a flexible and contextualized view of the sexual harassment of women in the workplace. Indeed, courts
have become more and more willing, in general, to permit recovery for nonphysical, dignitary harms of all kinds.
.
The rigidity of some courts is no reason at all to abandon the effort to make
workplace dignitary harms actionable. If some courts are rigid, the message to
those who wish to see a workplace right to be free of intentionally inflicted

245. See Chamallas, supra note 7, at 515-17.
246. But see Austin, supra note 121.
247. See Austin, supra note 121, at 6 ("Although employees win cases, the employers somehow
come out ahead."); see also id. at 9 (noting that courts are reluctant to acknowledge causes of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress "if the emotional h~ is an unintended or incidental result
of an exercise of legitimate workplace authority, civilly undertaken. The courts are particularly wary of
attempts to use [the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress] to evade the rules sanctioning the
summary discharge of at-will employees"). Despite these concerns, Austin concludes that tort law
remains a promising avenue to explore in fostering broader conceptions of worker rights.

56

THE

GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 88:1

dignitary harms is simple: they need to try harder. Scholarly articles must lay
out the reasons why courts should be sympathetic to such approaches and show
that such an approach is consistent with the history and evolution of common
law and is required by the changing nature and meaning of the workplace in
ordinary life. Test cases must be litigated in a concerted fashion, rather than
simply leaving to chance whether or not a particular plaintiff will choose to
make these arguments. The common law is inherently conservative, but it does
change over time; it has changed before, and it will change again?48
C. THE "LIABILITY AND PREEMPTION" OBJECTION

Some may argue that there are additional practical barriers in the way of
pursuing tort-based remedies for abusive workplace behavior, pointing specifically to two issues. First, in common law, employers are generally not responsible for the intentional torts of their agents on the grounds that employers can
hardly predict or prevent intentional wrongdoing. Second, tort remedies for
workplace harassment may face preemption problems under state workers'
compensation statutes.
These objections can be answered in the same fashion as the last objection.
On the level of principle, this objection is neither here nor there. On the level of
pragmatics, there are compelling public policy arguments for holding employers
liable for workplace harassment by subordinates. First, take the issue of employer liability.Z49 As noted in Part III.E, employees are essentially captives in
their places of employment, and employers are the lowest cost avoiders. In
assessing employer liability for abusive workplace behavior, courts could apply
the same standards laid out by the Supreme Court in Burlington 250 and Faragher,251 standards designed for assessing employer liability for hostile environment harassment under Title VII. In the case of harassment by a coworker, the
Court suggests its approval of a standard negligence-type test: if the employer
knew or should have known of the harassment, and failed to take reasonable
steps to prevent and/or remedy it, the employer will be liable. In cases of
supervisors harassing subordinates, the standard outlined by the Court is higher:
to defend against liability, employers must show that (a) they had a reasonable
policy designed to prevent and remedy harassment, and (b) the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of such a policy. 252
The issue of preemption by state worker's compensation statutes must also be
fought on public policy grounds. To preempt tort claims for dignitary harms

248. Cf Post, supra note 76; see also Larson, supra note 104, at 58 (noting the "possibility of such
transformative change using tort law as a tool").
249. Cf Bernstein, supra note 23, at 492-97 (making a tort law analogy to argue that employer
liability for sexual harassment under Title VII should be somewhere between fault-based liability and
strict liability).
250. Burlington v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
251. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
252. See generally Burlington, 524 U.S. at 742; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 775.
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inflicted in the workplace is, implicitly, to claim that dignitary abuse is something that is a necessary risk of going to work. This notion needs to be
resoundingly rejected: if all tort claims for intentional infliction of dignitary
harms were to be preempted by workers' compensation statutes, employers
would have little incentive to create nonabusive workplaces. Here, too, the
solution is continual test cases and a barrage of policy argument in tbe pages of
law journals and journals of opinion.
D. THE "CIVILITY CODE" OBJECTION

A final argument against a tort-based approach to workplace dignitary harassment might be that dignitary harm torts are simply too fuzzy and ill-defined and
that encouraging the use of these causes of action to remedy workplace abusiveness risks creating a workplace "civility code" that will operate to the detriment
of free expression and open and easy workplace interactions. 253 This objection
is the converse of the "rigid courts" objection discussed in Part IV. B.
Here, the fear is not that courts will make recovery difficult by defining terms
like "outrageous" or "offensive" in impossibly narrow ways. lnstead, the fear
is that courts will lower the bar too far, and plaintiffs will be able to recover too
easily, diluting the requirements of the dignitary harm torts until any minor
irritation or misunderstanding becomes actionable and all workplace comments
and actions will have to be self-censored.
This objection is also overblown. In practice, such an effect is unlikely to be a
problem: tort causes of action like invasion of privacy, defamation, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and assault and battery already exist, and in
applying them in nonemployment contexts, courts have, if anything, tended to
err on the side of caution in assessing plaintiff claims. The biggest danger with a
tort approach to harassment, as MacKinnon noted twenty years ago, is not that
courts will tend to let too much in: the danger is that they will not be flexible
enough.
This objection reflects, in part, a fear that a more flexible approach would
open the floodgates to a surge of frivolous litigation. But unless one is willing to
argue that there should be no tort recovery at all for injuries that are not physical
in nature, it is hard to claim that these causes of action should exist everywhere
but in the workplace. Prosser and Keeton comment:
The most cogent objection to the protection of such [purely dignitary] interests lies in the "wide door" which might be opened, not only to fictitious
claims, but to litigation in the field of trivialities and mere bad manners. It
would be absurd for the law to seek to secure universal peace of mind, and
many interferences with it must of necessity be left to other agencies of social
control. ... But [it] is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve
it, even at the expense of a "flood of litigation," and it is a pitiful confession

253.

See generally Duffy, supra note 205.

58

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 88:1

of incompetence on the part of any court of justice to deny relief on such
grounds. That a multiplicity of actions may follow is not a persuasive
objection: if injuries are multiplied, actions should be multiplied, so injured
persons may have recompense. So far as distinguishing true claims from false
ones is concerned, what is required is rather a careful scrutiny of the evidence
supporting the claim, and the elimination of trivialities calls for nothing more
than the same common sense which has distinguished serious from trifling
injuries in other fields of the law. 254

There are, however, two somewhat stronger forms of the "civility code"
objection. The first revolves around the proposal, made in Part III.E, that the
workplace context should lower the bar that plaintiffs need to surmount-that
due to the nature and meaning of work in modern American society, the
employment context should be considered an inherently aggravating factor in
assessing whether a defendant's actions are sufficiently "outrageous" or "offensive" as to permit recovery. This concern is legitimate and can only be addressed by stressing once more that the common law tends to err on the side of
conservatism. Robert Post's argument is worth repeating: "the common law
attempts not to search out and articulate first ethical principles, as would a
certain kind of moral philosopher, but instead to discover and refresh the social
norms by which we live. " 255 Lawyers and legal scholars are all norm clarifiers
and norm entrepreneurs, in one way or another, and can play an important role
in ensuring that tort-based causes of action are used and interpreted sensibly and
that employers do not go overboard in policing workplace speech and behavior.
Judges, too, should be urged to listen to claims of intentionally inflicted
workplace dignitary harms with sympathetic and open minds,. but without
losing hold of basic common sense precepts.
Justice Scalia addressed a version of this concern in his opinion in Oncale. 256
Scalia questioned how courts should distinguish between same-sex workplace
conduct that is abusive and conduct that, though perhaps annoying, should not
be actionable:
ln same-sex (as in all) harassment cases, [the] inquiry requires careful consideration of the social context in which particular behavior occurs and is
experienced by the target .... The real social impact of workplace behavior
often depends upon a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of
the words used or the physical acts performed. Common sense, and an
appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable courts and juries to distinguish
between simple teasing or roughhousing ... and conduct which a reasonable person
in the plaintiff's position would find severely hostile or abusive. 257
254.
255.
256.
257.

PRossER, supra note 79, at 56 (citations omitted).
See generally Post, supra note 76, at 970.
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
ld. at 1003.
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Justice Scalia points the way to a solution here. In the tort context, judges
could import the Supreme Court's test for determining the existence of "hostile
environment" sexual harassment: conduct must be severe and pervasive in order
to qualify as harassment. Judges could also look to some of the literature on
harassment for guidance: Brodsky, for instance, defines harassment in a genderneutral fashion, as "repeated and persistent attempts ... to torment, wear down,
frustrate, or get a reaction from another. It is treatment that persistently provokes, pressures, frightens, intimidates, or otherwise discomforts another person."258 Using definitions like these, judges should be able to draw principled
lines between the "mere insults" and "annoyances" that tort law cannot protect
us against, and workplace conduct that is so abusive as to seriously interfere
with a reasonable person's ability to function at work.
The genius of the common law is that it is able to be both conservative and
progressive and at once. 1t tends to be slow to change, but when it changes, the
changes generally and appropriately reflect deep shifts in social norms. To
paraphrase the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., "The arc of the common law is
long, but it arcs toward evolving social norms. " 259
The second more serious version of the "civility code" objection revolves
around the issue of employer liability: if employers will be liable for abuse in
the workplace, then employers and employees are potentially faced with a
problem that goes beyond self-censorship in the workplace. Employers may
have an incentive to police a civility code in ways that are chilling of harmless
forms of free expression-and they may also have an incentive simply to fire
workers who behave in ambiguous or borderline ways, on the grounds that it is
easier to fire a worker who may cause a problem than to keep that worker on but
control his behavior. 260 In a world where workers already have few job protections, employer liability for a broadened action of workplace harassment might
just give employers one more incentive to fire people.
This "chilling effect" is a compelling point, and here too, the exercise of
common sense is the most likely solution. If courts are sensible, employers will
likely be sensible, too. Ultimately, the "civility code" objection can only be
answered by reference to a familiar sort of balancing test: there is a risk, on the
one hand, that some employers, some of the time, and some judges, some of the
time, might seek to prevent or penalize trivial words or acts.Z 61 On the other

258. BRODSKY, supra note 50, at 2.
259. Harold Myerson, Left Behind: Why American Radicals Ain't, LA WEEKLY, Apr. 24, 1998, at 54
(quoting Dr. Martin Luther King: "The moral arc of the universe is long, but it arcs toward justice.").
Apologies to Dr. King.
260. I'm grateful to Vicki Schultz for pointing out this issue. But cf Stephanie Armour & Barbara
Hansen, Flood of "Retaliation" Cases Surfacing in U.S. Workplace, USA TODAY, Feb. 10, 1999, at lA
(discussing the increase in the number of employees fired for reporting problems like sexual harassment).
261. The concern about chilling workplace speech is somewhat ironic. On the whole, courts have
tended to conclude that employees have very few speech rights in the workplace--employers can
legally fire them for many acts of political speech. Yet although political conservatives have cheerfully
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hand, there is the reality that thousands of workers, of all races, genders,
nationalities, and religions, face severe abusiveness in the workplace, abuse that
can cause significant emotional distress and interfere unreasonably with their
ability to succeed as employees and citizens in the modem world.Z 62 Asserting
that all persons have a right to be free of severe dignitary assault in the
workplace is worth the risk.
V. CONCLUSION: WHY A PLURAL APPROACH TO WORKPLACE HARASSMENT Is
BETTER THAN AN EXCLUSIVE FOCUS ON TITLE

VII

Part I of this article notes some of the drawbacks of making Title VII the
exclusive focus of sexual harassment litigation and discussion. Part II outlined a
pluralistic approach to workplace harassment that distinguishes between the
nature of the harm of workplace sexual harassment (a dignitary harm) and the
context in which the harms of harassment occur (a context of discrimination
against women) and urged the need for an understanding of workplace harassment that would lead us to protect workers of any sex or sexual orientation from
all severe workplace harassment, whether sexual or nonsexual in nature. Part III
demonstrated that common law tort causes of action provide a promising way to
understand the dignitary harm element of classic cases of sexual harassment
(male harasser/female victim) and showed that these common law causes of
action contain the seed of a broad-based right to be free of severe dignitary
harm in the workplace, because employers are similar enough to common
carriers to hold them to a higher standard of care vis-a-vis their employees.
A pluralistic understanding of workplace harassment--one that embraces
both common-law torts and Title VII within its ambit-has three important
benefits. First, such a pluralistic approach allows for a legal remedy for the
many workers who experience severe harassment on the job, but who would be
hard pressed to assert that their harassment was "because of sex," as required
by even the most expansive reading of Title VII. Second, a pluralistic approach
keeps the focus of Title VII where it should be: on addressing the problem of
widespread workplace discrimination against members of discrete and vulnerable groups, such as racial, ethnic, and religious minorities, and, of course,
women. Third, grounding understanding of the sexual harassment of women in
a notion of dignitary harm as well as in a discrimination paradigm makes a
critical political and philosophical point: Workplace harassment of women is
wrong not because women are women, but because women are human beings
and share with all other human beings the right to be treated with respect and
concem. 263
applauded highly restrictive limits on political speech in the workplace, conservatives are among the
first to cry foul over proposals that might limit nonpolitical, abusive workplace speech. As an example,
see discussion in Balkin, supra note 206, at'[ 30.
262. Note that workplace abusiveness tends to further disempower the already disempowered, be
they women, blacks, or the poor. Cf Austin, supra note 121.
263. Cf Larson, supra note 104, at 74-75 (noting the "powerful implications of the idea that
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A. PROVIDING A POTENTIAL LEGAL REMEDY FOR WORKPLACE HARASSMENT
VICTIMS WHO CANNOT ASSERT SUCCESSFUL CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VII

Increased social awareness of the sexual harassment of women by men has
drawn attention to other kinds of workplace harassment as well. Men can be
harassed by women, women can be harassed by women, <tQd men can be
harassed by men. Moreover, people can be harassed in ways that are sexual,
through propositions, salacious comments, and the like, but they can also be
harassed in ways that are not sexual-they can be pressured, threatened,
denigrated, tormented, discomforted, and humiliated over their physical appearance, accent, clothing, height, weight, and so on. Even in cases of utterly
egregious harassment, however, not all such people have actionable Title VII
claims because not all of these people can show that they were harassed because
of their race, sex, religion, or national origin. 264
Encouraging a flexible tort-based approach to workplace harassment would
be a step toward providing a remedy for those who cannot prevail under Title
VII. By focusing on the dignitary harms that are at the core of workplace
harassment, tort law could provide remedies for those who suffer from severely
abusive, but nondiscriminatory, behavior in the workplace.
Most importantly, this approach furthers an important normative vision: it
promotes a vision of a workplace that is truly meritocratic, one where employees will be judged on their on-the-job competence, not on irrelevant characteristics such as physical appearance, accent, or whether they happen to resemble
the kind of person coworkers just do not like. Work is not optional for most
Americans: like it or not, most are dependent on work for their survival, and in
an increasing number of ways, work defines one in the eyes of others. The cost
of losing a job-or being forced to change jobs because harassment renders
working conditions intolerable-is extraordinarily high. The price of a paycheck should not be humiliation and fear. When entering the workplace, employees should not have to check their dignity at the door.
B. KEEPING TITLE VII'S FOCUS WHERE IT BELONGS: ON REMEDYING WORKPLACE
DISCRIMINATION

In the absence of a robust tort-based, dignitary harm understanding of
workplace harassment, plaintiffs have sought to use Title VII to remedy many
kinds of workplace harassment, including, most frequently, same-sex quid pro
quo and hostile environment sexual harassment. Victims of same-sex sexual
harassment often allege facts that are truly appalling-but that constitute "diswomen and people of color should be treated as beings of full humanity, with the same capacity to be
harmed, the same expectations of safety and control of their body, possessions, labor and sexuality, and
the same desire to make choices in pursuit of their life projects, as white, economically privileged
men"); Austin, supra note 121, at 5 ("The tort of outrage would serve a useful pedagogical function if
... [it] extolled the dignity of workers, and legitimated their claims to respectful treatment by
supervisors.").
264. See, e.g., Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co., 824 F.2d. 557 (7th Cir. 1987).
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crimination on the basis of sex" only under a definition that is either entirely
formalistic or somewhat forced. In Oncale, the Supreme Court suggested that a
male employee harassed in a sexual fashion by male coworkers could raise a
claim under Title VII if he could show that he would not have been harassed
"but for" being male.Z65 The Oncale Court implicitly suggested two possible
ways for Oncale to show this: first, using a desire-based model 266 he could
argue that his harassers were homosexual, and harassed him out of homosexual
desire-in that case, Oncale would have been harassed because of his sex,
because a similarly situated woman would presumably not have been desired by
her gay male coworkers and therefore would not have been sexually harassed.
Second, the Court suggested that Oncale might show that his male coworkers,
despite their own gender, were hostile to the presence of men (or additional
men, perhaps) in the workplace.
Proving either of these things would be difficult in practice.Z67 More to the
point, both highly formalistic avenues represent a trivialization of the deepest
purposes of Title VII. Title VII was enacted primarily to remedy discrimination
against members of groups that had historically been excluded from equal
access to social, political, and economic power. While a formalistic interpretation of what it means to be discriminated against on the basis of sex may satisfy
linguists, it undermines the goals of Title VII. Title VII was designed to prevent
women, along with members of certain other disadvantaged groups, from facing
disproportionate barriers to workplace success-it was not designed to protect
men in the workplace from the abusive behavior of other men.
Katherine Franke, Kathryn Abrams, and Vicki Schultz suggest another possible avenue for bringing same-sex, male-on-male harassment within the ambit
of Title VII. They argue that to the extent that male harassment of other men
may be motivated by a desire to maintain the workplace as a domain of
stereotypical masculinity, such harassment may constitute discrimination on the
basis of sex. In other words, if a man is harassed by other men at work for being
"effeminate," his harassers may be harassing for the very same reasons they would
harass a women: they want nothing "feminine" to seep into their domain, but instead
want to preserve the workplace as a site of masculine power and privilege.
This argument is stronger than more formalistic arguments for including
same-sex harassment within the ambit of Title VII. Nonetheless, even this
approach pushes the antidiscrimination paradigm a bit too far. Without drawing
a sharp line, Title VII should be reserved for fairly clear-cut cases in which
members of more powerful groups seek to prevent the workplace success or
advancement of members of discrete and vulnerable groups. Carving out a
robust tort-based remedy for people whose harassment does not fit this model
provides a means to have it both ways.

265.
266.
267.

Oncale v. Sundowner, 118 S. Ct. 998 ( 1998); see also discussion of Oncale, supra note 26.
The desire model has been elegantly critiqued by Vicki Schultz. See Schultz, supra note 4.
Cf Yoshino, supra note 24.
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The most fundamental point is one of principle. Title VII may be understood
in some circumstances to render same-sex harassment actionable, but doing so
may be a mistake. Feminists have already begun to pay for such mistakes, in
many of the ways suggested by Vicki Schultz. 268 Put another way, imagine two
circles, one wholly contained by the other. Label the outside circle "actions that
cause digni(ary harm" and label the inside circle "discriminatory actions." In
some sense, all discriminatory actions involve the infliction of dignitary harms,
making discrimination a subset of dignitary harm. However, not all actions that
cause dignitary harm are discriminatory. All severe workplace abuses should be
remediable under law, but not all should be remedied under Title VII. A
pluralistic understanding of workplace harassment permits us to keep the focus
of Title VII where it should be: on remedying discrimination against women.
C. EMPHASIZING THAT WOMEN ARE FULL AND EQUAL HUMAN BEINGS

Another important reason for a pluralistic understanding of workplace harassment exists. To the extent that women who are harassed by men in the
workplace focus exclusively on Title VII as a remedy, the risk of a backlash is
exacerbated. Not, indeed, a justified backlash, but a backlash that feminists must
nonetheless take into account when choosing legal strategies. Thus, Ellen Paul
decries Title VII approaches as promoting "victimology," 269 and Mark Hager
asserts that "Title VII harassment liability encourages a dependent . . . and
passive form of feminism. " 270
By adopting a pluralist approach to workplace harassment, women who are
harassed at work could assert both Title VII and tort causes of action. The Title
VII cause of action is important: if women are someday to have equal access to
social, political, and economic power, society must constantly be reminded of
the ways in which women are disproportionately disadvantaged in the workplace. Intentional discrimination against women continues to occur, and even
acts that are not motivated by a discriminatory impetus may nonetheless have
an adverse impact on women.
The tort-based prong is equally important. By emphasizing the related notions of personhood and dignitary harms, a tort approach makes a critical point
about what is, and what is not, wrong with the workplace harassment of women.
A tort approach to the workplace harassment of women emphasizes that such
harassment is not wrong because women somehow have "special" rights,
because women are inherently weaker or more sensitive than men, because men
are always predatory and domineering, or because women are doomed forever
to be victims. Workplace harassment, sexual or nonsexual, wrongs women
because they are human beings-and all human beings, regardless of sex, have
a right to be treated with respect and concern.
268.
269.
270.

See generally Schultz, supra note 4.
Paul, supra note 23, at 347-49; see also examples of backlash, supra note 5.
Hager, supra note 23, at 424.
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The argument that all human beings are deserving of respect is important
philosophically: although workplace harassment of women occurs in a context
of discrimination, such harassment is not wrong because it wrongs women.
Female or male, we all are human beings, and workplace harassment wrongs us
all.

